







The Shared Features Principle:  
If two objects share a feature, people assume those objects also share 
other features 
 
Sean Hughes, Jan De Houwer, Simone Mattavelli, & Ian Hussey 
 
In this paper we introduce the shared features principle which refers to the idea that, 
when two stimuli share one feature, people often assume that they share others features 
as well. This principle can be recognized in several known psychological phenomena, 
most of which were until now never considered to be related in this way. To illustrate 
the generative power of the principle, we report eight pre-registered studies (N = 1614) 
in which participants completed an acquisition phase containing three stimuli: a neutral 
target, a positive source, and a negative source. Our results indicate that behavioral 
intentions, automatic evaluations, and self-reported ratings of a target object were 
influenced by the source object with which the target shared a feature. This was even 
the case when participants were told that there was no relation between source and 
target objects. Taken together, the shared features principle appears to be general, 
reliable, and replicable across a range of measures in the attitude domain. We close 
with a discussion of its theoretical implications, relevance to many areas of 
psychological science, as well as its heuristic and predictive value 
 
Scientific principles are valuable because they 
highlight commonalities amongst many different 
empirical phenomena. In doing so, they not only create 
order within existing scientific knowledge (i.e., their 
heuristic or organizing function) but also point us 
towards new and previously undiscovered instances of 
that principle (i.e., their predictive function). In this 
paper, we introduce a new principle to the realm of 
psychology. This principle, which we refer to as the 
shared features principle, postulates that when stimuli 
share one feature, people will assume that those 
stimuli share other features as well. We first provide 
an overview of existing phenomena in which the shared 
features principle can be recognized. We then consider 
the principle itself in more detail by relating it to 
concepts that can be applied to a wide variety of 
phenomena. Finally, we illustrate the predictive value 
of the principle by demonstrating novel instantiations 
that control for alternative factors.  
Let us first consider existing phenomena that 
seem to represent instances of the shared features 
principle. Take the minimal group effect in social 
psychology (Otten, 2016; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & 
Flament, 1971). Research shows that when individuals 
are arbitrarily assigned to the same group based on 
some shared feature (e.g., similar clothing item or 
preference for certain paintings), people assume that 
those individuals share other features as well (e.g., 
that others will share the participant’s own traits; van 
Veelen, Otten, Cadinu, & Hansen, 2016). In the 
context of stigmatization, the mere proximity effect 
shows that when a stigmatized and non-stigmatized 
person share a similar physical location to one another, 
people assume that they also share other features (e.g., 
a normal weight individual will be stigmatized more 
when they stand next to an overweight individual; 
Hebl & Mannix, 2003).  
In consumer and marketing psychology, research 
on counterfeit brands shows that these brands 
intentionally imitate the physical properties of (and 
thus share features with) high status brands in the 
hope this will influence assumptions about, and 
ultimately consumption of, the fake brand itself (e.g., 
assumptions that it is also high in quality, status, and 
worth purchasing; Phau & Teah, 2009). In moral 
psychology, when one person (John) is accountable for 
his past actions (e.g., membership of the Nazi party) 
and is said to share a feature with a second person 
(Tom) (e.g., John and Tom are part of the same 
family), this shared feature influences the assumptions 
people make about the latter’s moral accountability 
(e.g., they assume that Tom is also morally responsible 
for his family member’s actions; Uhlmann, Zhu, 




principle can also be recognized in learning 
psychology. In evaluative conditioning (EC), for 
instance, the fact that a neutral stimulus shares a 
similar time and location with a valenced stimulus 
often leads the former to acquire properties of the 
latter (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & 
Crombez, 2010). This is also true for attribute 
conditioning: when an unknown person and a known 
athlete share one feature (spatio-temporal properties), 
people assume that they also share other features as 
well (the CS is viewed as being more athletic or 
healthy: Unkelbach & Högden, 2019). 
If we take a step back, set the specific stimuli and 
responses to the side, and search for commonalities 
between the above, then we see that each phenomenon 
involves a broadly similar situation: one where people 
make assumptions about the properties of one stimulus 
(e.g., how positive or negative a person, group, or 
brand product is) based on the fact that it shares some 
other feature (e.g., physical or spatio-temporal 
properties) with a second stimulus (another person, 
group, or brand product). 
If we are correct, then there are remarkable 
similarities between seemingly different domains in 
psychological science, which offers many new 
opportunities for cross-fertilization. Today the 
aforementioned effects are typically studied in 
isolation, with different researchers busy documenting 
the moderators and mediators of the behaviors they 
are interested in, and rarely interacting with their 
colleagues (or drawing on findings) from other 
intellectual domains. This does not have to be the 
case. In addition to illuminating previously hidden 
similarities and differences between psychological 
phenomena (heuristic value), the shared features 
principle also opens up entirely new avenues for study 
(predictive value). Before unpacking its heuristic and 
predictive value, we will first specify the principle 
itself. We will do so by drawing on a recently 
developed conceptual framework that centers on the 
idea of feature transformation (De Houwer, Richetin, 
Hughes, & Perugini, 2019).  
Feature Transformation 
Because the shared features principle applies to a 
wide range of known, and still to-be-discovered 
empirical phenomena, it is best described in abstract 
terms that do not refer to a specific phenomenon. De 
Houwer et al. (2019) recently introduced a framework 
that may prove useful in this regard. Their framework 
consists of four abstract concepts: source features, 
target features, source objects, and target objects. 
According to this perspective, ‘objects’ are broadly 
                                                             
1 We distinguish target and source feature from target and 
source objects because the target and source features can 
either be part of the same object or they can be part of 
defined as any potential stimulus or behavior: they can 
refer to people, animals, inanimate items, and even 
responses. Features are defined as any assumed state 
of an object. These states can have multiple values and 
can relate to many different properties, from physical 
(e.g., height), to psychological (e.g., intelligence, 
valence), and behavioral (e.g., the way in which an 
object responds to its environment; also see Tversky, 
1977).  
The shared features principle is concerned with 
two types of features: source features and target 
features.1 Target features are those features of an 
object about which assumptions are being made. 
Source features are those features of an object which 
give rise to assumptions about target features. The 
object that possesses the target feature is called the 
target object whereas the object that possesses the 
source feature is called the source object.  
The target feature is typically the dependent 
variable whereas the source feature is the independent 
variable under investigation. The value of a source 
feature can be varied in order to investigate if this 
influences the corresponding value of the target 
feature. To illustrate this more clearly, take the halo 
effect. Here features of the source object (e.g., how 
attractive a person is) lead people to make 
assumptions about features of a target object (e.g., 
how intelligent that person is). The source and target 
feature can belong to the same object (e.g., judging 
how intelligent an attractive person is) or to different 
objects (e.g., judging how intelligent the partner of an 
attractive person is; see Forgas & Laham, 2016, for a 
review). In studies on the halo effect, the value of a 
source feature (perceived attractiveness) is varied to 
investigate if this influences the value of a target 
feature (perceived intelligence). 
When a feature of a source object influences the 
assumptions made about a feature of a target object, 
feature transformation is said to take place. The term 
‘transformation’ highlights that a source feature can 
give rise to assumptions about the features of a target 
object, and that the latter can change in ways that are 
similar or different to the former. To illustrate, let’s 
return to the halo effect wherein features of a source 
object (e.g., how attractive a person is) influence 
assumptions about target object features (e.g., how 
intelligent a person is). It may be that an assimilative 
halo effect emerges for men (attractive males are 
thought to be competent in job hiring situations) 
whereas contrast effects emerge for women (attractive 
females are thought to be less competent in certain job 
hiring situations; see the ‘beauty is beastly effect’; 
different objects (for a more detailed treatment see De Houwer 
et al., 2019). In the case of shared features effects the source 




Paustian-Underdahl, & Walker, 2016). The term 
transformation captures both possibilities. 
The Shared Features Principle 
The shared features principle tells us why a wide 
variety of feature transformation effects occur: it 
implies that when source and target objects share 
some feature with one another people will make 
assumptions about other features of the target object. 
Verifying that two objects share a feature involves the 
identification of a feature that is part of both objects 
(also see Tversky, 1977). For instance, in minimal 
group effects, source and target objects both 
independently possess a common feature (e.g., the 
color of the clothing that they wear).2 
The shared features principle is grounded in the 
phenomenon of generalization (see Ghirlanda & 
Enquist, 2003). Broadly speaking, generalization refers 
to the transfer of properties from one stimulus to 
another when those stimuli are similar along some 
dimension. The shared features principle implies that 
one can vary similarity by manipulating the features 
of objects (see Tversky, 1977, for a justification of this 
assumption) and builds on recent research showing 
that generalization is not limited to similarity with 
regard to perceptual features but also encompasses 
similarity at the symbolic level (Hughes et al., 2018). 
It also extends beyond simple generalization by 
allowing for a transformation of features (and not 
merely a transfer of features) to take place from one 
stimulus to another.  
Finally, just like any scientific principle, the 
shared features principle does not always hold but does 
so only under certain conditions (e.g., it is likely that 
the shared feature needs to be salient). In fact, one of 
the aims of research is to uncover the moderators of 
scientific principles. Like all functional scientific 
principles (e.g., gravity), the principle does not specify 
the mechanism by which instances of the principle are 
brought about, nor does it assume that the same 
mechanism mediates all instances of the principle. 
Although we will speculate about the mental 
mechanism mediating shared features effects at the 
end of our paper, the main aim of the paper is to 
                                                             
2 Note that this requirement excludes feature transformation 
effects that are due to related features. For instance, in 
endowment effects (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990) and 
mere ownership effects (Beggan, 1992), people ascribe more 
value to things that they own. In this case feature 
transformation does take place (e.g., people assume that the 
object is higher in value or status because it is related to the 
self). However, this change in assumptions about the object is 
not due to the fact that the person and object share a feature. 
In fact, the person-object relation implies that the person and 
object have different features (i.e., the person is the owner 
introduce the principle itself and illustrate its heuristic 
and predictive value. 
Heuristic Value. The shared features principle has 
considerable heuristic value. As illustrated above, it 
can be applied to a wide variety of existing phenomena 
that were never previously viewed as being connected 
(e.g., it highlights commonalities and differences 
between effects in person perception and counterfeit 
branding). The unifying nature of the principle can be 
further strengthened by using the terms of the feature 
transformation framework. Until now, the social, 
persuasion, marketing, moral, and learning psychology 
literatures each adopted different terms when 
describing instances of the shared features principle. 
As a result, there is currently a multiplicity of concepts 
that can undermine our ability to ‘see the forest 
through the trees’ (i.e., to identify what is genuinely 
similar or different between various types of shared 
feature effects). For instance, evaluative and attribute 
conditioning research refers to conditioned (CS) and 
unconditioned stimuli (US), whereas operant 
conditioning research refers to discriminative stimuli 
(Sd) and reinforcers (Sr). These terms are rarely used 
in research on marketing, halo, moral accountability, 
and person perception. Rather these domains employ 
idiosyncratic terms that typically refer to the specific 
properties of the features and objects being studied 
(e.g., the status of products).  
The feature transformation framework in general, 
and shared features principle in particular, circumvent 
this issue by providing a common or ‘universal’ 
language that allows one to describe and functionally 
explain many phenomena using a limited set of terms. 
Concepts such as source/target and object/feature can 
be used to describe shared feature effects that are 
typically studied (under different names) in different 
domains. For example, in impression formation 
research, we can refer to the fact that a source object 
(Bob) possesses a certain feature (e.g., is violent). 
When people then learn that a target object (Mike) 
shares some other feature with the source (e.g., they 
have physical characteristics in common), we can say 
that this shared feature leads people to make 
assumptions about the target object’s features (e.g., 
whereas the object is owned). Although such related features 
(i.e., features that are different aspects of a single relation) 
could also underlie feature transformation, we differentiate 
related features from shared features as functional causes of 
feature transformation. One reason for this is that it is unclear 
how related features influence similarity whereas there are 
good arguments for assuming that shared features increase 
similarity (Tversky, 1977). Hence, whereas feature 
transformation because of shared features might be grounded 
in generalization (see below), feature transformation because 




that Mike is also violent). The same concepts can also 
be applied to conditioning research. Here too people 
learn that a source object (US) possesses a certain 
feature (e.g., is valenced as in EC or athletic as in 
attribute conditioning). They then learn that a target 
object (CS) shares some other feature with the source 
(e.g., both are presented together in space and time). 
As a result, people make assumptions about the target 
object’s features (that the CS is also valenced or 
athletic). The very same concepts can be used when 
dealing with different types of learning, stigmatizing, 
prejudice, branding, and so on.  
In short, the shared features principle allows 
researchers to conceptualize and speak about effects in 
ways that (a) enhance communication within and 
between intellectual domains, (b) prevent 
fragmentation, confusion, or conflict resulting from the 
use of multiple terms to describe the same underlying 
phenomenon, and (c) reveals similarities and 
differences between phenomena. While acknowledging 
important differences between domains, it argues that 
many effects involve four basic elements (source 
object, target object, source feature, and target 
feature), a situation wherein the source and target 
share one feature, and as a result, new assumptions 
are made about other target object features. 
Predictive Value. The shared features principle 
also has predictive value and allows us to view old 
phenomena in new ways. Take EC, for instance, which 
can be defined as a change in evaluation due to 
regularities in the presence of two stimuli (see De 
Houwer & Hughes, 2020). Most researchers think of 
EC effects merely in terms of the spatio-temporal 
properties of stimuli, that is, the fact that stimuli are 
presented together in space and time. Yet our account 
takes a different perspective. It argues that EC effects 
may actually be due to the fact that the CS and US 
share a feature with one another, and in EC studies, 
this shared feature just so happens to be the time and 
location at which they are presented. If correct, then 
the crucial element in EC is the fact that stimuli share 
a feature and not the mere fact that they are paired in 
space and time. Note that this new way of thinking 
does not draw EC effects into question – simply our 
prior explanation of the observed changes in liking. In 
other words, we are not questioning that regularities 
in the presence of two stimuli can lead to changes in 
liking. Rather we are re-conceptualizing spatio-
temporal contiguity as just one way to induce a shared 
feature effect. This new perspective leads to the 
                                                             
3 Often, EC is defined as changes in liking that are due to the 
pairing of stimuli (e.g., De Houwer, 2007). Bar-Anan and 
Balas (2018) correctly pointed out that the concept ‘pairing’ 
could be understood in a broad sense as ‘putting together’ or 
‘joining to form a pair’. In that sense, also presenting two 
prediction that EC-like effects can also be found when 
stimuli share a feature other than their spatio-
temporal presence (e.g., the color in which stimuli are 
presented). Verifying this prediction would support 
the idea that EC is just one instance of a much broader 
class of share features effects and would illustrate the 
predictive power of the shared features principle.3 
The Current Research  
With the above in mind we carried out eight 
studies. Each employed a broadly similar format which 
we will preview here. We first asked participants to 
complete an acquisition phase. During this phase a 
series of trials were presented wherein three stimuli 
simultaneously appeared onscreen: a positive source 
object, a negative source object, and a neutral target 
object. We then manipulated the extent to which the 
target object shared a feature with a certain source 
object. In Experiments 1-3 the shared feature was the 
color in which stimuli were presented: half of the trials 
presented the neutral target object in the same color 
as the positive source whereas the other half presented 
the neutral target object in the same color as the 
negative source object. In Experiment 4 the shared 
feature was the size of the stimuli: half of the trials 
presented the neutral target object in the same size as 
a positive source whereas the other half presented the 
target object in the same size as a negative source. In 
Experiment 5 the shared feature was conceptual in 
nature. We first trained a class of conceptually related 
color stimuli (Blue-Same-Yellow and Green-Same-
Purple) and then, during the acquisition phase, 
presented a neutral target object in either blue or 
green, along with a positive source in yellow and a 
negative source in purple. Experiments 6-8 excluded 
alternative explanations for this effect, replicated our 
prior findings with yet another dependent measure 
(evaluative priming), extended our findings into a 
socially relevant domain (person perception), and 
show that they hold even when people are told that 
there is no relation between the source and target, and 
that these object are being presented randomly 
together (further reducing the likelihood that the 
effect is driven by demand or represents a 
communication effect).  
Following the acquisition phase, we assessed for 
evaluations using self-report ratings and an indirect 
procedure (either the Implicit Association Test [IAT] 
or the Evaluative Priming Task [EPT]). We added 
these latter procedures as scores obtained from these 
tasks are assumed to reflect more automatic 
stimuli in the same color could be seen as a form of pairing. 
However, as is common in the literature on EC, we use the 
term ‘pairing’ only in the sense of ‘spatio-temporal pairing’ 
and thus limit EC to its standard meaning of changes in liking 




evaluations that can influence subsequent behavior in 
unique ways (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, 
& Moors, 2009). If changes in liking are driven by mere 
spatio-temporal contiguity then we would expect to 
see similar and ambivalent evaluative responses 
towards both target objects (given that they were both 
repeatedly paired with positive and negative source 
objects). Yet if those same effects are driven by the 
fact that the target and source share another feature 
(e.g., color, size, location) then we would expect to 
observe positive evaluations of one and negative of the 
other. If our account is correct, changes in liking 
should be moderated by a range of different features 
that are shared by stimuli.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 114 English-
speaking volunteers (62 females; Mage = 33.12, SD = 
8.39) participated online via the Prolific Academic 
website (https://prolific.ac) in exchange for a 
monetary reward (€1.50). The experiment was 
programmed in Inquisit 4.0 and hosted via Inquisit 
Web (Millisecond Software, Seattle, WA). It involved 
a single-factor between-subjects design (Shared 
Feature: target stimulus shared color with positive vs. 
negative source object), with self-reported ratings and 
IAT effects as the main dependent variables. Three 
method variables were manipulated between 
participants: evaluative task order (self-reports vs. IAT 
first), IAT block order (learning [acquisition] phase 
consistent vs. inconsistent first) and stimulus 
assignment (which target object appeared in the same 
color as positive or negative source objects). The 
sample size was determined prior to data collection on 
the basis of a power analysis. We stopped data-
collection when 114 participants had completed all 
measures of the experiment to ensure that we would 
have sufficient statistical power to detect medium 
effects (planned sample size after exclusions = 110 
which gives power = 0.80 to find an effect size of d = 
0.47 at alpha = 0.05, two-tailed; or power = 0.95 to 
find an effect size of d = .63). Note that a similar 
analytic strategy was used in Experiments 1-8 and 
planned sample sizes were therefore similar (excepted 
where noted). The study designs were pre-registered, 
and are available, along with the raw data, and 
analytic plans for this and all other experiments on the 
Open Science Framework website (osf.io/pqm9v). We 
report all manipulations, measures, and studies run. 
All data were collected without intermittent data 
analysis.  
Materials 
Stimuli. Two nonwords (Morag and Struan) 
served as the target objects. Six positive (rainbow, 
pleasure, smile, love, paradise, joy) and six negative 
words (war, cancer, hate, hell, misery, vomit) served 
as the positive and negative source objects.  
IAT. The two nonwords served as one set of 
target stimuli and the words “Good” and “Bad” as 
another. Eight positively valenced and eight 
negatively valenced adjectives served as one set of 
attribute stimuli (fantastic, great, nice, good, 
pleasant, wonderful, amazing, happy versus terrible, 
disgusting, nasty, horrible, sick, awful, sad, 
unpleasant) and the two nonwords served as the 
second set. 
Procedure 
Participants were first provided with a general 
overview of the experiment and then asked for their 
informed consent. The study consisted of three phases: 
acquisition phase, evaluative measures, and 
exploratory questions. 
Acquisition phase. Prior to the acquisition phase 
participants were told the following: “you will 
encounter two new words: MORAG and STRUAN. 
You have probably never seen these words before. 
These words will appear on the screen together with 
two other words. The new word (MORAG or 
STRUAN) and the other words will initially appear in 
white. Then the color of the three words will change. 
Please pay close attention to the colors of each word 
and how they change. You will be asked some 
questions about this later in the study”. 
The acquisition phase then consisted of three 
blocks of 16 trials (48 total), with each block 
containing two types of trials: one trial in which one 
nonword was eventually presented in the same color 
as positively valenced words, and another trial in 
which a second nonword was eventually presented in 
the same color as negatively valenced words. 
Specifically, three stimuli simultaneously occurred 
onscreen during each trial: a neutral target object 
(either Morag or Struan) along with a positive and 
negative source object (i.e., a positively and negatively 
valenced word). All three stimuli were initially 
presented in white against a black background for 
3000ms. On certain trials, the first nonword (e.g., 
Morag) and the positively valenced word both changed 
to the same color (e.g., blue) whereas the negatively 
valenced word changed to a different color (e.g., 
green). On other trials, the second nonword (e.g., 
Struan) and the negatively valenced word both 
changed to one color (e.g., yellow) whereas the 
positively valenced word changed to another color 
(e.g., purple). All stimuli remained onscreen for 
another 3000ms and were then removed, followed by 
an inter-trial interval of 1250ms, and the next trial. 
Stimulus color (i.e., blue, green, yellow and purple) 
was varied across trials, so that none of the colors 




(see Figure 1). Assignment of Morag or Struan to 
share a similar feature (color) as positive or negatively 




Figure 1. Illustration of the two types of trials during the 
acquisition phase of Experiment 1. During the first half of the 
trial (left) the neutral target and two source stimuli were 
presented in white. During the second half of the trial (right) 
the target and one of the sources changed to the same color 
whereas the second source stimulus changed to a different 
color. 
 
Self-reported ratings. Self-reported evaluations of 
Morag and Struan was indexed using four semantic 
differential scales. On each trial, one of the two 
nonwords was presented and participants had to 
evaluate it using a scale ranging from -5 to +5 with 0 
as a neutral point. The four end-points of the scales 
were: Negative-Positive, Pleasant-Unpleasant, Good-
Bad, I Like It-I Don’t Like It. A mean evaluative 
rating was calculated for each nonword by averaging 
scores from the four scales. 
IAT. We sought to index automatic evaluations 
using an IAT. Participants were informed that a series 
of words would appear one-by-one in the middle of the 
screen and that their task was to categorize those 
items to their respective target (Morag or Struan) or 
attribute categories (‘Good’ and ‘Bad’) as quickly and 
accurately as possible. They were told that the two 
nonwords they had previously encountered (Morag 
and Struan) as well as the words “Good” and “Bad” 
(attributes) would appear on the upper left and right 
sides of the screen and that stimuli could be assigned 
to these categories using either the left (‘E’) or right 
keys (‘I’). Each trial began with the presentation of a 
target or attribute stimulus. If the participant 
categorized the word correctly - by selecting the 
appropriate key for that block of trials - the stimulus 
disappeared from the screen and the next trial began. 
In contrast, an incorrect response resulted in the 
presentation of a red “X” which remained on-screen 
until the correct key was pressed. Overall, each 
participant completed seven blocks of trials. The first 
block of 20 practice trials required them to sort Morag 
and Struan into their respective categories, with 
Morag assigned to the left (‘E’) key and Struan to the 
right (‘I’) key. On the second block of 20 practice 
trials, participants assigned positive words to the 
“Good” category using the left key and negative words 
to the “Bad” category using the right key. Blocks 3 and 
4 (20 and 40 trials, respectively) involved a combined 
assignment of target and attribute stimuli to their 
respective categories. Specifically, participants 
categorized Morag and positive words using the left 
key and Struan and negative words using the right 
key. The fifth block of 20 trials reversed the key 
assignments, with Struan now assigned to the left key 
and Morag to the right key. Finally, the sixth and 
seventh blocks (20 and 40 trials respectively) required 
participants to categorize Morag with negative words 
and Struan with positive words. Note that assignment 
of Morag and Struan to the left/right categories was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Behavioral Intentions. We also assessed if the 
acquisition phase altered behavior intentions towards 
the two nonwords. Participants were presented with 
two brand products labeled with either Morag or 
Struan. They were asked to indicate which of these 
products they would be willing to try in a supermarket 
and given the following five options: I would try 
Morag, I would try Struan, I would try Morag and 
Struan, I would try neither, I don’t know. 
Exploratory Questions. At the end of the study 
we asked a number of final questions for purely 
exploratory reasons. First, we probed to see if 
participants had source valence awareness: “In the 
first part of the experiment (when words appeared 
initially in white and then switched their color), 
MORAG/STRUAN was always presented with two 
words. What was the meaning of those words?”, 
response options (Both words always had a positive 
meaning, Both words always had a negative meaning, 
One word always had a positive meaning and the other 
one a negative meaning, I don’t remember). Second, 
we probed for target-source contingency awareness: 
“In the first part of the experiment (when words 
appeared initially in white and then switched their 
color) did the color of MORAG/STRUAN always 
switch to the same color as...” and given the following 
response options (The positive word that was also on 
the screen, The negative word that was also on the 
screen, I don’t remember). A manipulation check was 
also included to examine if participants wrote down 
the target-source contingencies during the task: “Think 
back to the first part of the experiment (i.e., when 
three words were paired onscreen). Did you ever take 
















you figure out what was going on? Please be honest 
here (you will receive payment regardless of what you 
say” and provided with an open-ended response option. 
We then probed for demand compliance – first for the 
self-reported ratings (“Earlier you rated MORAG and 
STRUAN as being either positive, neutral, or negative. 
Did you base your ratings NOT on how you actually 
felt about those words but ONLY on what you thought 
the researchers wanted you to say?”) and then for the 
IAT (“Earlier you completed the Implicit Association 
Test. Did you base your performance in that task NOT 
on your best efforts to perform the categorizations as 
quickly and accurately as possible but on your attempt 
to influence your speed or accuracy in order to go 
along with what you thought the researchers wanted 
you to feel about the words?”). In both cases the 
response options were (Yes, No, I don’t know). 
Reactance was probed in a similar way - first for the 
self-reported ratings (“Earlier you rated MORAG and 
STRUAN as being either positive, neutral, or negative. 
Did you consciously resist what you thought the 
researchers wanted you to feel about those words?”) 
and then for the IAT (“Earlier you completed the 
Implicit Association Test. Did you try to influence 
your speed or accuracy in order to consciously resist 
what you thought the researchers wanted you to feel 
about those words”). In both cases the response options 
were (Yes, No, I don’t know). Finally, we probed for 
shared feature awareness: “During the first part of the 
study, did you notice that the color of MORAG and 
STRUAN switched to the same color as either positive 
or negative words?”, and influence awareness: “Did this 
influence how you responded to MORAG and 
STRUAN?”. An open-ended response option was 
provided in each case. It should be noted that we did 
not examine if performance on these questions 
moderated evaluations within each individual study. 
Rather we did so meta-analytically (where power was 
available to answer such a question; for an overview of 
these exploratory questions see Table 1).4 
Results 
Analytic Strategy. A series of Welch’s 
independent sample t-tests (along with Cohen’s d 
effect sizes and their 95% confidence intervals) were 
carried out on the rating and IAT data to determine 
whether evaluations of a nonword (dependent 
variables) differed as a function of the features it 
shared with a source object (e.g., the fact that one 
nonword shared a feature [i.e., color] with positively 
valenced words, and the second nonword shared a 
                                                             
4 During the review process we came to appreciate that several 
items could have been conceptualized better in our pre-
registered documents (see osf.io/jer49). We decided to change 
how these questions are described in the paper itself to better 
reflect what we now believe the items to actually target (e.g., 
feature with negatively valenced words; independent 
variable). The behavioral intentions data was analyzed 
using multi-nominal logistic regression models to 
assess whether participants were more likely to choose 
a certain nonword on the basis of shared features. A 
similar analytic strategy was used in Experiments 2-5. 
Data Preparation. 
Exclusions. We excluded data from eight 
participants who did not complete the entire session. 
The data of participants who had IAT error rates 
above 30% across the entire task or above 40% for any 
one of the four critical blocks, or who responded faster 
than 400ms on more than 10% of trials were excluded 
(n = 3). This led to a final sample of 103 participants. 
Self-reported ratings. For each nonsense word, 
self-reported ratings from the four semantic 
differential scales were averaged. This led to two mean 
evaluative scores – one for the first nonsense word and 
another for the second nonsense word. A difference 
score was then calculated by subtracting the latter 
from the former. Positive values indicate a relative 
preference for the nonword that eventually shared a 
color with a positively valenced word over the 
nonword that shared a color with a negatively 
valenced word. Negative values indicate the opposite. 
IAT. Following the recommendations of 
Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003), response 
latency data were prepared using the D scoring 
algorithm. The resulting D-IAT scores reflect the 
difference in mean response latency between the 
critical blocks divided by the overall variation in those 
latencies. The IAT score was calculated so that 
positive values reflected a relative preference for the 
nonwords that eventually shared a color with a 
positively valenced word relative to the nonword 
which eventually shared a color with a negatively 
valenced word. Negative values indicated the opposite 
response pattern. 
Hypothesis Testing. 
IAT. IAT scores differed as a function of whether 
a nonword shared its color with a positively or 
negatively valenced word, t(98.12) = 6.63, p < .001, d 
= 1.31, 95% CI = [0.88, 1.74], BF10 > 105. When 
Morag shared a color with a positively valenced word 
and Struan shared a color with a negatively valenced 
word, participants showed a relative preference for 
Morag over Struan (M = 0.37, SD = 0.46). When the 
color contingencies were reversed, participants 
preferred Struan over Morag (M = -0.23, SD = 0.45).  
 
we now refer to one item as a ‘shared feature awareness’ 
question instead of a ‘hypothesis awareness’ question). These 
changes have been noted in the documentation attached to 





Table 1. Percentage of sample who were source valence aware, target-source contingency aware, demand compliant, 
and reactant in each experiment. 
 





contingency aware IAT Self-report IAT Self-report 
1 65.0 71.8 17.5 15.5 19.4 16.5 
2 65.0 62.1 14.6 11.7 9.7 15.5 
3 79.4 79.4 18.6 22.7 11.3 14.4 
4 78.1 62.0 7.5 17.6 9.6 15.0 
5 74.9 45.3 14.0 19.6 8.4 15.1 
6 - - 1.7 8.2 7.4 15.2 
7 78.1 56.8 7.0 14.1 10.5 10.0 
8 94.9 - 1.4 13 10.9 22.5 
 
 
Self-reported ratings. Self-reported ratings 
also differed as a function of whether a nonword shared 
its color with a positively or negatively valenced word, 
t(98.32) = 8.33, p < .001, d = 1.65, 95% CI = [1.20, 
2.10], BF10 > 106. When Morag shared a color with a 
positively valenced word and Struan shared a color 
with a negatively valenced word, participants showed 
a relative preference for Morag over Struan (M = 3.33, 
SD = 4.60). When the color contingencies were 
reversed, participants preferred Struan over Morag (M 
= -4.15, SD = 4.48).  
Behavioral intentions. Data from the 
behavioral intentions question were entered into a 
multinomial logistic regression with Morag as the 
reference category. Only results from the direct 
comparison of Morag and Struan were relevant to the 
shared feature hypothesis and are reported here (i.e., 
hypotheses do not refer to the selections of neither 
stimulus or both stimuli). Results demonstrated that 
participant’s intentions towards Morag relative to 
Struan differed between the two shared feature 
conditions. The odds that a participant would choose 
the nonword that shared a feature with a positive word 
(versus the one that shared a feature with a negative 
word) were OR = 13.66, 95% CI = [3.56, 52.44], p = 
.0001. 
Discussion  
Results provide a novel demonstration of the 
shared features principle in the attitude domain that 
goes beyond the impact of mere spatio-temporal co-
occurrence. Although a neutral target object was 
repeatedly paired with both positive and negative 
source objects, it acquired the valence of the source 
object that it shared a feature (color) with it. 
Specifically, target objects that appeared in the same 
color as positive source objects were rated positively 
whereas target objects that appeared in the same color 
as negative source objects were rated negatively. We 
also obtained evidence for this shared feature effect as 
indexed by automatic evaluations and behavioral 
intentions.  
Experiment 2 
In our second experiment we set out to replicate 
and extend our initial findings. In Experiment 1, 
participants completed an acquisition phase during 
which all stimuli were initially presented in white and 
only later changed to the same or a different color. In 
Experiment 2, however, we presented all stimuli in the 
same color during the first half of the trial. During the 
second half, we switched the color of one the valenced 
words, while keeping the color of the other valenced 
word the same as the neutral nonword. This modified 
design allowed us to differentiate between two 
explanations of our effects. The first (shared feature 
hypothesis) argues that an overlap in some stimulus 
feature (in this case color) will lead people to indicate 
that those same stimuli share other properties 
(valence). If so, then we should expect a similar 
pattern of findings as obtained in Experiment 1. A 
second possibility (salience hypothesis) entails that 
people’s attention is fixated on any salient change in 
the context. Assuming that the effects of spatio-
temporal contiguity is magnified when one or both of 
the contiguous events are salient (e.g., Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972), one could argue that the change in 
liking for nonword could have resulted from the mere 
spatio-temporal contiguity between the nonword and 
salient valenced word (i.e., the valenced word whose 
color changed). This alternative account entails that 
the observed effect was an instance of EC (i.e., a 
feature transformation effect due to the sharing of 
spatio-temporal properties) rather than a feature 
transformation effect that is due to the sharing of 
color. If so, then the neutral nonword should acquire 
the valence of the valenced word which switches color 
within the trial (i.e., the salient source stimulus), 






Participants and design. 118 participants (67 
females; Mage = 32.3, SD = 8.6) took part in the study 
via the Prolific Academic website.  
Procedure 
A similar procedure was used as in Experiment 1 
with the exception of the acquisition phase. 
Acquisition phase. Prior to the acquisition phase 
participants were told the following: “In the first part 
you will see two new words: MORAG and STRUAN. 
You have probably never seen these words before. 
These words will appear onscreen together with two 
other words. The new word (MORAG or STRUAN) 
and other words will initially appear in one color. Then 
the color of one of the words will change. Please pay 
close attention to the colors of each word and how they 




Figure 2. Illustration of the two types of trials during the 
acquisition phase of Experiments 2 and 3. During the first 
half of the trial (left) the neutral target and two source 
stimuli were presented in the same color. During the second 
half of the trial (right) the target and one of the sources 
remained the same color whereas the second source changed 
to a different color. 
 
Training once again consisted of three blocks of 
16 trials (48 total), with each block containing two 
different types of trials: one in which one nonword 
(e.g., Morag) stayed the same color as positive words, 
and another in which a second nonword (e.g., Struan) 
stayed the same color as negative words. Unlike 
Experiment 1, the nonword and two valenced words 
were initially presented in the same color for 3000ms. 
During one type of trial, one nonword and the 
positively valenced word remained in the same color 
(e.g., blue) whereas the negatively valenced word 
changed color (e.g., purple). During the second type of 
trial, the second nonword and the negatively valenced 
word remained in the same color (e.g., yellow) while 
the positively valenced word changed color (e.g., 
green). All stimuli remained onscreen for a further 
3000ms before being removed, followed by an inter-
trial interval, and the next trial (see Figure 2). 
Exploratory questions. Exploratory questions 
were broadly similar to those reported in Experiment 
1, with two exceptions. First, the target-source 
contingency awareness question was altered to fit the 
procedure used in Experiment 2: “In the first part of 
the experiment, when MORAG/STRUAN appeared on 
the screen, which of the following words switched to a 
different color…” response options (The positive 
words, The negative words, I don’t remember). 
Second, the shared feature awareness question was 
altered for a similar reason: “During the first part of 
the study, did you notice that the color of one of the 
two words presented on the right side of the screen 
changed, while the other word stayed the same color 
as MORAG or STRUAN?”. 
Results 
Data Preparation. We excluded data from 12 
participants who did not complete the entire 
experimental session, and a further three who failed to 
maintain IAT performance criteria. This led to a final 
sample of 103 participants. 
Hypothesis Testing.  
IAT. We did not obtain evidence that IAT scores 
differed as a function of the color that a nonword 
shared with a valenced word, t(100.85) = -1.18, p = 
.24, d = -0.23, 95% CI = [-0.62, 0.16], BF10 = 0.38. It 
seems that participants generally favored one nonword 
(Struan) over the other (Morag). This was true when 
(a) Morag remained in the same color as positive 
words (and the color of negative words changed; M = 
-0.26, SD = 0.54), or (b) when Struan remained in the 
same color as positive words (and the color of negative 
words changed; M = -0.12, SD = 0.60).  
Self-reports. We did not obtain evidence that 
self-reported ratings differed as a function of the color 
that a nonword shared with a valenced word, t(100.98) 
= -1.09, p = .28, d = -0.21, 95% CI = [-0.61, 0.18], 
BF10 = 0.35. Once again, participants generally 
favored one nonword (Struan) over the other (Morag). 
This was true when (a) Morag remained in the same 
color as positive words (and the color of negative 
words changed; M = -2.80, SD = 5.33), or (b) when 
Struan remained in the same color as positive words 
(and the color of negative words changed; M = -1.58, 
SD = 6.03).  
Behavioral intentions. Data were prepared 
and analyzed as in Experiment 1. Although 
participants intentions towards the two nonwords 
differed between the two shared features conditions, 
they did so in the opposite direction as predicted. That 
is, participants were less likely to choose the nonword 
that shared a feature with a positively valenced word 
















valenced word), OR = 0.22, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.66], p 
= .007.  
Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 2 differ from those 
obtained in Experiment 1. During the acquisition 
phase a neutral nonword and two valenced words were 
first presented in the same color. One of the valenced 
words then changed to a different color while the other 
remained in the same color as the neutral nonword. 
We did not obtain evidence for the idea that self-
reported and automatic evaluations emerged when 
such a procedure was used.  
 
 
Figure 3. Kernel density plots illustrating distribution of IAT 
scores (upper panels) and self-reported ratings (lower panels) 
in Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 3 
After inspecting the distribution of scores on the 
evaluative measures we came to appreciate that there 
was a high degree of variability in evaluative 
responding (see Figure 3). This suggests there may 
have been different groups of participants in our 
sample: those that did not show any evaluations 
towards either nonword (for potentially different 
reasons), those that showed evaluations in line with 
the shared features principle (i.e., nonword acquires 
the same valence as the valenced word it shares a color 
with) and a third group that showed evaluations in 
line with a salience hypothesis (e.g., nonword acquires 
the same valence as the valenced word which changes 
color). It appears that this latter group exerted more 
of an impact on the (overall) group level responses 
reported in Experiment 2 than the other groups.  
In retrospect, we believe there may have been a 
relatively simple explanation for the difference in 
results of Experiments 1 and 2: the change in task 
instructions from Experiment 1 to 2. In Experiment 2 
participants were told that “you will see two new 
words: Morag and Struan. These words will appear 
onscreen together with two other words. The new 
word (Morag or Struan) and other words will initially 
appear in one color. Then the color of one of the words 
will change…Please pay close attention to the color of 
each word and how they change”. These instructions 
may have encouraged people to focus greater attention 
on the change, rather than the overlap, in color, and 
thus treat changes in color as more diagnostic about 
nonword valence than the shared feature. If so, then 
modifying task instructions in a way that directs 
attention to the shared feature may lead to similar 
effects as seen in Experiment 1. With this in mind, we 
replicated Experiment 2 while modifying the 
instructions to emphasize that the nonwords and 
valenced words remained in the same color.  
Method 
Participants and design. 118 participants (70 
females, Mage = 28.19, SD = 6.08) took part in the 
study via the Prolific Academic website. 
Procedure 
An identical procedure was used as in Experiment 
2 with the exception of the instructions provided prior 
to the acquisition phase. 
Acquisition phase. Prior to training participants 
were told the following: “You are going to see a new 
word appear on the screen (i.e., Morag or Struan). 
Morag or Struan will appear on the left of the screen. 
Two other words will appear on the right. Morag or 
Struan and other words will first appear in the same 
color. Morag or Struan will stay the same color as one 
of the words on the right. Please pay close attention 
to the colors of the words. You will be asked some 
questions about this later on.” 
Exploratory questions. Although the exploratory 
questions were similar to those used in Experiment 2 
we did make several changes. First, the phrasing of the 
source valence awareness question was revised to 
make it easier for the participant: “In the first part of 
the experiment we presented MORAG/STRUAN 
along with two other words. Did...?” and the response 
options were (Those two other words always have a 
positive meaning, Those two other words always have 
a negative meaning, One word always had a positive 
meaning and the other had a negative meaning, I don’t 
remember). The same went for the shared feature 
awareness question: “During the first part of the study, 
did you notice that the color of one of the two words 
presented on the right side of the screen changed, while 
the other word stayed the same color as MORAG or 
STRUAN?”, and the influence awareness question 
“Did the fact that the words stay the same color or 
change color influence how much you liked or disliked 
MORAG or STRUAN?”.  
Results 
Data Preparation. Nine participants did not 
complete the entire session whereas an additional 
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twelve did not meet the IAT criteria. This led to a 
final sample of 97 participants. 
Hypothesis Testing.  
IAT. IAT scores differed as a function of the 
valence of the valenced word that had the same color 
as the neutral nonword, t(93.42) = 3.29, p = .001, d = 
0.66, 95% CI = [0.25, 1.08], BF10 = 20.10. When 
Morag remained in the same color as the positive word 
(and the color of the negative word changed) and when 
Struan remained in the same color as the negative 
word (and the color of the positive word changed), 
participants demonstrated a relative preference for 
Morag over Struan (M = 0.21, SD = 0.46). When the 
color contingencies were reversed, participants 
demonstrated a relative preference for Struan over 
Morag (M = -0.15, SD = 0.59). 
Self-reported ratings. Self-reported ratings 
also varied as a function of the color relation between 
target and source objects, t(92.94) = 5.52, p < .001, d 
= 1.13, 95% CI = [0.69, 1.56], BF10 > 104. When 
Morag remained in the same color as the positive word 
(and the color of the negative word changed), and 
when Struan remained in the same color as the 
negative word (and the color of positive word 
changed), participants showed a relative preference for 
Morag over Struan (M = 2.92, SD = 5.25). When the 
color contingencies were reversed participants 
demonstrated a relative preference for Struan over 
Morag (M = -2.85, SD = 5.02).  
Behavioral intentions. Intentions towards the 
nonwords differed between the two shared features 
conditions, and in a way that was congruent with prior 
training. Specifically, the odds that a participant 
would choose the nonword that shared a feature with 
a positive word (over the one that shared a feature 
with a negative word) were OR = 6.94, 95% CI = 
[2.03, 23.77], p = .002. 
Discussion 
When task instructions directed attention 
towards (rather than away from) the shared feature, a 
shared features effect emerged. Specifically, neutral 
nonwords that shared a color with positive words were 
liked more than those which shared a color with 
negative words. We obtained evidence for the shared 
features effect on self-report, automatic (IAT), and 
behavioral intention measures. Importantly, the effect 
arose even though the nonword and valenced words 
shared their color from the start of each trial. Unlike 
the effect that was observed in Experiment 1, the 
effect in Experiment 3 can therefore not be explained 
in terms of mere salience.  
Experiment 4 
Until now we have seen how one particular shared 
feature (color) comes to moderate automatic and self-
reported evaluations. Yet our account suggests that 
other shared features should function in a similar way. 
Indeed, a common size, direction, location, smell, or 
taste shared by two stimuli should lead people to act 
as if those stimuli share other features as well (e.g., 
valence). Therefore, in order to extend and generalize 
our findings, we swapped one shared feature (color) for 
another (size), to demonstrate that this second feature 
can also moderate likes and dislikes whenever two 
stimuli share it. In Experiment 4 participants once 
again encountered an acquisition phase in which three 
stimuli (neutral target, positive source, negative 
source) were presented onscreen. This time one neutral 
nonword and a positive word were presented in the 
same sized font whereas the negative word was 
presented in a differently sized font. Likewise, a second 
nonword and a negative word shared a common sized 
font whereas a positive word was always presented in 
a different sized font. If we are correct, then the 
nonwords should acquire the same valence as the 
valenced words with which they share a common size.  
Method 
Participants and design. 212 participants (103 
females, Mage = 30.33, SD = 6.18) took part in the 
study via the Prolific Academic website. Given the 
change in shared feature from color to size (which we 
thought might be subtler) we decided to double our 
planned sample size relative to Experiments 1-3. The 
same was true for Experiment 5. A sample size of 200 
participants provides sufficient power to detect effect 
sizes of d >= 0.4 (power = 0.80 at alpha = 0.05, two-
tailed) or d = .47 (power = 0.95 at alpha = 0.05, two-
tailed). 
Procedure 
A similar procedure was used as in Experiments 
1-2 with the exception of the acquisition phase. 
Acquisition phase. Prior to the acquisition phase 
participants were told the following:  
“In the next part of the experiment you are going 
to see a novel word appear on the screen (i.e., 
MORAG or STRUAN). MORAG or STRUAN will 
appear on the left while two other words will appear 
on the right side of the screen. MORAG or STRUAN 
and other words will all appear in certain sizes. Please 
pay close attention to the sizes of the words. You will 
be asked some questions about this later on”. 
Training then consisted of three blocks of 16 trials 
(48 total) consisting of two different types of trials. 
During one type of trial the first nonword (e.g., 
Morag) was presented in the same sized font (e.g., 8% 
of screen height) as the positive word and a different 
sized font as the negative word (e.g., 4% of screen 
height). In another type of trial, the second nonword 
(e.g., Struan) was presented in the same sized font the 
negative word and a different sized font the positive 




(white) and the sizes of the fonts was randomly 
counterbalanced across trials (e.g., sometimes a target 
and source share a small [4%] font and at other times 
they shared a large [8%] font; see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Illustration of the four types of trials during the 
acquisition phase of Experiment 4. Neutral targets were 
presented in the same or different size (sometimes in large 
and other times in small font) as positive or negative targets. 
 
Exploratory questions. A similar set of 
exploratory questions were used as in Experiment 3, 
with the following exceptions. First, the target-source 
contingency awareness question was revised to fit the 
procedure:  
“Think back to the first part of the experiment 
(where the three words were presented together 
onscreen). Was MORAG always presented in” and the 
response options were (The same size letters as 
POSITIVE Words, The same size letters as 
NEGATIVE words, I don’t remember). A similar 
rationale was used to change the shared feature 
awareness question: “Think back to the first part of the 
experiment. During that part of the study, we 
presented MORAG and Positive Words in the same 
sized letters and STRUAN and Negative Words in the 
same sized letters. Did you notice this during the 
study?”, and influence awareness questions: “Do you 
think that the fact that MORAG and Positive words 
were presented in the same sized letters (and that 
STRUAN and Negative Words were presented in the 
same sized letters) influenced how you rated or 
otherwise responded towards MORAG or STRUAN?”. 
Results 
Data Preparation. Fifteen participants did not 
complete the entire session whereas an additional nine 
did not meet the IAT criteria. This led to a final 
sample of 188 participants. 
Hypothesis Testing. 
IAT. IAT scores differed as depending on the 
feature shared by neutral nonwords and valenced 
words, t(184.00) = 5.02, p < .001, d = 0.73, 95% CI = 
[0.44, 1.03], BF10 > 104. When Morag was presented 
in the same size font as a positive word and Struan 
was presented in the same size font as a negative word, 
participants showed a relative automatic preference 
for Morag over Struan (M = 0.16, SD = 0.48). When 
the size contingencies were reversed, participants 
demonstrated a relative preference for Struan over 
Morag (M = -0.18, SD = 0.46).  
Self-reported ratings. Self-reported ratings 
differed as a function of whether neutral nonwords and 
valenced words shared a feature, t(179.27) = 8.51, p < 
.001, d = 1.25, 95% CI = [0.93, 1.59], BF10 > 106. 
When Morag was presented in the same sized font as 
a positive word, and Struan was presented in the same 
sized font as a negative word, participants showed a 
relative preference for Morag over Struan (M = 3.57, 
SD = 4.99). When the size contingencies were 
reversed, participants showed a relative preference for 
Struan over Morag (M = -2.18, SD = 4.21).  
Behavioral intentions. Intentions towards the 
nonwords differed between the two shared features 
conditions, in a way that was congruent with prior 
training. Specifically, the odds that a participant 
would choose the nonword that shared a feature (size) 
with a positive word (over the one that shared a 
feature with a negative word) were OR = 7.63, 95% 
CI = [3.11, 18.76], p < .0001. 
Discussion 
Results indicate that size can also function as a 
shared feature that moderates automatic and self-
reported evaluations as well as behavioral intentions. 
During the acquisition phase a neutral nonword was 
presented with two valenced words – one positive and 
another negative. When a nonword was presented in 
the same size as positive word it was liked more than 
a nonword that was presented in the same size as a 
negative word. These findings replicate those obtained 
in Experiments 1 and 3 and demonstrate that different 
types of shared features lead to the transformation of 
evaluations and intentions. 
Experiment 5 
In Experiments 1-4, we exclusively focused on 
how physical features shared by stimuli (e.g., color or 
size) influence behavioral intentions, automatic and 
self-reported evaluations. Yet, as we highlighted in the 
introduction, there are many instances where the 
features that objects share are conceptual in nature. 
For instance, minimal group effects can emerge when 
people are said to share a conceptual relation with one 
another (e.g., are said to be ‘overestimators’ or 
‘underestimators’ based on their prior behavior; e.g., 
Tajfel et al., 1971). Moral spill-over effects can occur 
when people are said to share a conceptual relation 
(e.g., they are family members; Uhlmann et al., 2012). 
















feature transformation on the basis of physical and 
conceptual shared features.  
In Experiment 5 we set out to experimentally 
model conceptual shared feature effects. Specifically, 
we first trained two conceptual categories that each 
consisted of two colors (e.g., Blue-Same-Yellow and 
Green-Same-Purple) followed by a similar acquisition 
phase to that used in Experiments 1-3. However, this 
time, we presented a neutral nonword in either blue or 
green along with a positive and a negative word that 
were presented in either yellow or purple. If a nonword 
is presented in blue and a positive word is presented 
in yellow (along with a negative word in purple) then 
participants should evaluate the nonword positively 
(given that blue and yellow were trained to be 
conceptually similar to one another in the first phase 
of the experiment). In contrast, if participants 
encounter a nonword in green along with a negative 
word in purple (and a positive word in yellow) then 
they should evaluate that nonword negatively (given 
that green and purple were trained to be similar to one 
another during the acquisition phase). Such a finding 
would further replicate our existing findings and 
expand the remit of the shared features principle by 
demonstrating that the shared feature moderating 
attitude formation can be conceptual rather than 
purely physical in nature.  
Method 
Participants and design. 214 participants (108 
females, Mage = 30.65, SD = 6.08) took part in the 
study via the Prolific Academic website. 
Procedure. The study consisted of four phases: 
color training, acquisition, evaluative measures, and 
exploratory questions. 
Color training. Color training consisted of three 
blocks of 16 training trials followed by one block of 16 
test trials. A Matching to Sample (MTS) task was 
used to establish relations between two sets of colors 
(e.g., Yellow-Blue and Green-Purple). On each trial, 
one color was presented at the top of the screen, and 
two at the bottom. Participants had to select the color 
at the bottom that went with the color at the top and 
were told that corrective feedback provided by the 
computer would help them do so. When a correct 
response was emitted then all stimuli were removed 
from the screen, a feedback message (‘Correct’) 
presented, followed by a 500ms ITI. If an error was 
made, stimuli were once again removed, corrective 
feedback provided (‘Wrong’), an ITI followed by the 
next trial. Test trials were identical to training trials 
with the exception that corrective feedback was no 
longer provided (see Figure 5). Prior research on 
stimulus equivalence learning shows that such a MTS 
training procedure results in people responding as if 
the related stimuli are equivalent (see Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 5. Illustration of the two types of trials during the 
color training phase of Experiment 5. Selecting blue in the 
presence of yellow, or purple in the presence of green (and 
vice-versa) was reinforced and any other color relation 
punished. 
 
Acquisition phase. Prior to the acquisition 
phase participants were told the following: “In the next 
part of the experiment you are going to see a novel 
word appear on the screen (i.e., MORAG or 
STRUAN). MORAG or STRUAN will appear on the 
left while two other words will appear on the right side 
of the screen. MORAG or STRUAN and other words 
will all appear in certain colors. Please pay close 
attention to the color of the words. You will be asked 
some questions about this later on”. 
Training consisted of three blocks of 16 trials (48 
total), with each block containing two types of trials: 
one type of trial where the first nonword (e.g., Morag) 
was presented in one color (e.g., blue), a positive word 
was presented in a second color (e.g., yellow), and a 
negative word was presented in a third color (e.g., 
purple). In another type of trial the second nonword 
(e.g., Struan) was presented in a fourth color (e.g., 
green), and the valenced words were presented in the 
aforementioned colors. Stimulus assignment to the 
various colors was counterbalanced across 
participants. All three stimuli were presented against 
a black background for 5000ms. Thereafter, all stimuli 
were removed, followed by an inter-trial interval of 
750ms, and the next trial (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Illustration of the two types of trials during the 
acquisition phase of Experiment 5. During one type of trial 
(left) a neutral target and positive sources were presented in 
colors that had previously been related. During a second type 
of trial (right) a second target and negative sources were 
presented in colors that had also been related during the color 
training phase. 
 










Evaluative measures. Evaluative measures 
were similar to Experiments 1-4.  
Exploratory questions. Participants were 
asked a similar set of exploratory questions as in 
Experiment 4 with several exceptions. We also now 
probed for color contingency awareness (i.e., what the 
relationship was between the various colors):  
“Think back to the first part of the experiment 
where you learned about the relationship between 
colors. What color was 
BLUE/YELLOW/GREEN/PURPLE related to” and 
given the following options (Green, Yellow, Purple, I 
don’t remember) (note: the name of the color in the 
question was never offered as a response option). We 
also assessed target-source contingency awareness 
(i.e., if they could recall what color the TOs and SOs 
were presented in): “In the second part of the 
experiment, when MORAG/STRUAN appeared on the 
screen with two other words, what color was 
MORAG/STRUAN/Positive words/Negative words 
presented in” and given the following options (Green, 
Blue, Yellow, Purple, I don’t remember). Finally, we 
revised the shared feature awareness question: “Think 
back to the first part of the experiment. During that 
part of the study, we trained you to relate Blue to 
Yellow and Green to Purple. In the second part (see 
below), we presented one of the words on the left in 
blue (or green) and the words on the right in yellow or 
purple. Did you notice this during the study?”, and 
influence awareness question: “Do you think that the 
color that the words were presented in influenced how 
you rated or otherwise responded towards MORAG or 
STRUAN?”). 
Results 
Data Preparation. Fifteen participants failed to 
provide complete data. A further twenty failed to meet 
the IAT criteria. This led to a final sample of 179 
participants. 
Hypothesis Testing.  
IAT. IAT scores differed depending on the 
valence of the word that shared a color connection 
with a neutral nonword, t(168.75) = 3.79, p < .001, d 
= 0.57, 95% CI = [0.27, 0.87], BF10 = 109. When 
Morag was presented in a color that was equivalent to 
the color a positive word was presented in, and Struan 
was presented in a color that was equivalent to the 
color a negative word was presented in, participants 
preferred Morag over Struan (M = 0.14, SD = 0.46). 
When the color contingencies were reversed, 
participants preferred Struan over Morag (M = -0.12, 
SD = 0.46). 
Self-reported ratings. Self-reported scores 
differed depending on the valence of the word that 
shared a color connection with a neutral nonword, 
t(169.77) = 7.66, p < .001, d = 1.15, 95% CI = [0.83, 
1.47], BF10 > 106. When Morag was presented in a 
color that was equivalent to the color that positive 
words were presented in, and Struan was presented in 
a color that was equivalent to the color that negative 
words were presented in, participants preferred Morag 
over Struan (M = 2.34, SD = 4.12). When the color 
contingencies were reversed, participants preferred 
Struan over Morag (M = -2.38, SD = 4.09). 
Behavioral intentions. Intentions towards the 
nonwords differed between the two shared features 
conditions, in a manner that was congruent with prior 
training. Specifically, the odds that a participant 
would choose the target object that shared a feature 
with a positive word (over the one that shared a 
feature with a negative word) were OR = 5.00, 95% 
CI = [1.91, 13.06], p = .001. 
Discussion 
Experiment 5 extends our account further and 
shows that conceptual shared features give rise to 
automatic and self-reported evaluations in a similar 
way to physical shared features. Prior to the 
acquisition phase, two relations between colors were 
trained (i.e., Blue-Similar-Yellow, and Green-Similar-
Purple). Thereafter a neutral nonword was 
simultaneously presented with two valenced words. 
Critically, one nonword was presented in blue whereas 
the other was presented in green. The positive words 
were presented in yellow and negative words in purple. 
Self-reported ratings, IAT effects, and behavioral 
intention measures all indicated that the nonword 
presented in blue was preferred relative to the 
nonword presented in green, supporting the idea that 
a shared conceptual feature can led to a transfer of 
other properties (i.e., valence).  
Experiment 6 
Thus far our findings have been framed as shared 
feature effects (i.e., as changes in evaluation that occur 
when stimuli a share feature with one another). Yet 
we thought it useful to entertain alternative 
theoretical ideas about our findings. Take, for 
instance, the possibility that the findings reported in 
Experiments 1-5 are instances of a non-shared features 
effect. According to this alternative account, stimuli 
which do not share a feature are evaluated in opposite 
directions. Hence, a neutral nonword does not acquire 
its valence from the valenced word it shares a feature 
with (‘target-same-as-positive source’) but from the 
valenced word that it does not share a feature with 
(‘target-opposite-to-negative source’). 
Experiment 6 sought to replicate and extend our 
findings while controlling for a non-shared feature 
explanation. In our original acquisition phase three 
stimuli were always presented: a neutral nonword 
along with a positive and a negative word. We 





Figure 7. Illustration of the trial progression during the acquisition phase of Experiment 6. During the first half of the trial (left) 
all eight stimuli (two positive sources, two negative sources, two neutral sources, and two neutral targets) were presented in the 
same color. During the second half of the trial (right) one of the targets and a positive source changed to the same color. 
 
 
presented: six stimuli (two positive, two negative, two 
neutral) along with two nonwords. During the first 
half of each trial all stimuli appeared in white. During 
the second half of the trial one neutral nonword and 
one valenced word were presented in the same color 
while all other stimuli remained in white. From a non-
shared feature perspective, participants should not 
produce a strong evaluative response to that nonword 
because it does not share a feature with six stimuli of 
differing valence (i.e., the positive, negative, and 
neutral stimuli that, unlike the Morag, remain white). 
In contrast, the shared features principle would once 
again predict evaluations in-line with the valence of 
the single valenced stimulus whose color switches to 
the same color as the nonword.  
Method 
Participants and design. 262 participants (119 
female, Mage = 27.30, SD = 7.36) took part in the 
study via the Prolific Academic website. 
Procedure. The procedure was similar to 
Experiment 3 with several exceptions (see below).  
Acquisition phase. Prior to the acquisition phase 
participants were told the following:  
“In the next part of the experiment you are going 
to see a new word on the screen (i.e., MORAG or 
STRUAN). This new word (MORAG or STRUAN) 
will appear together with other words. These words will 
appear in certain colors. Please pay close attention to 
the color of the words. You will be asked some 
questions about this later on”. 
Training then consisted of three blocks of 16 trials 
(48 total), with each block containing two types of 
trials: one type of trial where the first nonword (e.g., 
Morag) and one of the positive words eventually 
shared a color, and another where the second nonword 
(e.g., Struan) and one of the negative words eventually 
shared a color. Specifically, each trial contained eight 
stimuli: two positive words (either Love, Happy, 
Beautiful, Peace, Friendship, and/or Success), two 
negative words (e.g., Agony, Murder, Vomit, Disease, 
Cancer, and/or Torture), two neutral words (Table, 
Building, Glass, Street, Number, and/or Bowl), as well 
as two neutral nonwords (Morag and Struan). Stimuli 
were selected from a large valenced word norm study 
(Moors et al., 2013). All stimuli initially appeared in 
the same color (white). After 3000ms the color of one 
nonword and one valenced word changed (e.g., blue) 
while the other six stimuli maintained the same color 
as before (white). Stimuli remained onscreen for 
another 3000ms before all stimuli are removed, 
followed by an inter-trial interval of 1000ms, and the 
next trial. Four stimulus colors were used (lime, 
fuchsia, yellow, and deep-sky-blue) and stimulus color 
was varied across trials so that no color could acquire 
a specific valence (see Figure 7). 
Evaluative measures. Evaluative measures were 
similar to Experiments 1-5.  
Exploratory questions. We modified the phrasing 
of certain items for clarity purposes. For instance, the 
source valence awareness question now asked: “In the 
beginning of the experiment we initially presented 
MORAG/STRUAN together with several words. 
MORAG/STRUAN and these words all appeared in 
WHITE. Did the OTHER words...?” response options 
(always have a positive meaning, always have a 
negative meaning, have different meanings [e.g., some 
were positive, some were negative, some were neutral], 
I don’t remember). The target source contingency 
awareness question asked: “During the first part of the 
experiment MORAG/STRUAN and another word 
changed color. Did MORAG/STRUAN...:” response 
options (and POSITIVE WORDS subsequently share 
a color, and NEGATIVE WORDS subsequently share 


















a color, I don’t remember). The demand question for 
their self-reported ratings asked: “Earlier you rated 
MORAG and STRUAN as being either positive, 
neutral, or negative. Did you base your response on 
how you actually felt about those words OR on what 
you thought the researchers wanted you to say?” 
response options (How I actually felt about MORAG 
and STRUAN, What I thought the researchers wanted 
me to say [i.e., not on how I personally felt], I don’t 
know), while the same question for the IAT asked: 
“Earlier you completed the Implicit Association Test. 
Did you base your performance in that task on your 
best efforts to perform the categorizations as quickly 
and accurately as possible? Or did you attempt to 
influence your speed or accuracy in order to go along 
with what you thought the researchers wanted you to 
feel about the words? Response options (I tried to 
perform the task as quickly and accurately as possible, 
I tried to alter my performance based on what I 
thought the researchers wanted to find, I don’t know). 
The shared feature awareness question now asked: 
“Think back to the first part of the experiment. We 
showed you MORAG and POSITIVE WORDS in the 
same color. We also showed you STRUAN and 
NEGATIVE WORDS in the same color. Did you 
notice this during the first part of the study?”, whereas 
the influence awareness question stated: “Do you think 
that the fact that MORAG and POSITIVE WORDS 
were presented in the same color (and that STRUAN 
and NEGATIVE WORDS were presented in the same 
color) influenced how much you like or dislike 
MORAG or STRUAN?”. 
Results 
Data Preparation. Twenty-three participants 
failed to provide complete data. A further eight failed 
to meet the IAT criteria. This led to a final sample of 
231 participants. 
Hypothesis Testing.  
IAT. IAT scores differed depending on the 
valence of the valenced word that shared a color with 
a neutral nonword, t(227.66) = 7.25, p < .001, d = 
0.96, 95% CI = [0.68, 1.23], BF10 > 106. When Morag 
was presented in the same color as positive words, and 
Struan was presented in the same color as negative 
words, participants preferred the former over the 
latter (M = 0.31, SD = 0.51). When the color 
contingencies were reversed, participants preferred 
Struan over Morag (M = -0.18, SD = 0.52). 
Self-reported ratings. Self-reported scores 
differed depending on the valence of the valenced word 
that shared a color with a nonword, t(227.44) = 12.08, 
p < .001, d = 1.58, 95% CI = [1.29, 1.88], BF10 > 106. 
When Morag was presented in the same color as 
positive words, and Struan was presented in the same 
color as negative words, participants preferred Morag 
over Struan (M = 3.61, SD = 4.72). When the color 
contingencies were reversed, participants preferred 
Struan over Morag (M = -3.40, SD = 4.09). 
Behavioral intentions. Intentions towards the 
two nonwords differed between the two shared 
features conditions, in a manner that was congruent 
with prior training. Specifically, the odds that a 
participant would choose the nonword that shared a 
feature with a positive word (over the one that shared 
a feature with a negative word) were OR = 14.85, 95% 
CI = [6.98, 31.63], p < .0001. 
Discussion 
Experiment 6 extends our shared feature account 
still further. It reveals that changes in evaluation occur 
due to the features that stimuli share with one another 
rather than the features they do not share. During the 
acquisition phase participants encountered eight 
words: two positive words, two negative words, two 
neutral words, and two neutral nonwords. During the 
first half of each trial all stimuli appeared in white. 
Later on, one nonword and one valenced word were 
presented in the same color while the other stimuli 
remained in white. According to a non-shared feature 
account, a nonword does not acquire its valence from 
the word it shares a feature with (e.g., ‘target-same-
as-positive source’) but the word that it does not share 
a feature with (e.g., ‘target-opposite-to-negative 
source’). Such an account cannot explain the effects 
reported here given that there were now six stimuli of 
varying valence that never shared the color-feature 
with the nonword during the second half of the trial, 
which should have led to ambivalent responses 
towards the nonword. In contrast, self-reported 
ratings, IAT effects, and behavioral intention 
measures all indicated that the nonword which shared 
a feature with positive words was evaluated more 
positively than the nonword that shared a feature with 
negative words.  
Experiment 7 
 Experiments 1-6 demonstrate that when stimuli 
share features with one another changes in self-
reported and automatic evaluations can occur. 
However, one might ask to what extent such effects 
are driven by demand characteristics (i.e., by 
participants recognizing the contingencies operating 
within the task and responding, not based on their 
actual evaluations of the stimuli, but rather on what 
they believe the researcher wants them to say). When 
designing the studies we were sensitive to such a 
possibility and decided to include an indirect 
procedure (the IAT) which is arguably less susceptible 
to demand than self-report measures. But one might 
still question the extent to which even IAT effects 
reflect genuine changes in automatic evaluation. Given 




attempt to replicate the shared features effect, but this 
time using the EPT as an indirect procedure. 
Although, like most (implicit) measures in psychology, 
evaluative priming effects are not entirely 
uncontrollable (e.g., Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 
2013), they are generally considered to provide a valid 
index of automatic evaluation (e.g., De Houwer et al., 
2009). Moreover, because of the structural differences 
between IAT and EPT procedures (De Houwer, 2003), 
a replication of our findings using the EPT would 
indicate that the observed effects on the IAT are not 
due to procedural elements that are unique to the IAT.  
In Experiment 7 we focused on size as a shared 
feature given that we already replicated color-based 
effects in five of our six studies (and size only once). 
As such, replicating our prior findings would also 
strengthen the conclusion that our effects are not 
limited to color as a shared feature.  
Method 
Participants and design. 539 participants took 
part in the study via the Prolific Academic website.5 
After excluding participants with partial data, the 
final analytic sample consisted of 492 participants (242 
women, 246 men, 5 did not provide gender data; Mage 
= 28.28, SD = 7.43). Note, that in this experiment, 
we opted to use a Sequential Bayes Factor (SBF) 
design with a maximal N (e.g., Schönbrodt & 
Wagenmakers, 2018). Specifically, we use a threshold 
of > 3 or < 0.33, a default Cauchy prior (r = .707), a 
minimum of 300 participants, an addition of 100 
participants for each test, and a maximum of 500 
participants (we ran an additional 39 participants to 
allow for 500 participants after exclusions).  
Stimuli. The two nonwords MORAG and 
STRUAN were used as prime stimuli. Targets 
consisted of ten positive words (e.g., fantastic, great, 
nice, good, pleasant, attractive, delight, smile, trust, 
positive) and ten negative words (e.g., terrible, 
disgusting, nasty, horrible, sick, abuse, failure, grief, 
negative, pain).  
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 4 with 
one notable exception: an EPT was used in the place 
of an IAT.  
Evaluative priming task. Automatic evaluations 
were assessed using an EPT in which participants are 
asked to categorize target words as either positive or 
negative using the E and I keys of a computer 
keyboard. During all trials, the labels “good” and “bad” 
appeared on the lower left and right corners of the 
                                                             
5 We should also note that our preregistration stated 
thresholds of > 3 and < 0.16. This was due to an oversight 
on our behalf – such asymmetries between cutoffs for H0 and 
H1 are uncommon in practice. Common convention (e.g., 
Jeffreys, 1961; Lee and Wagenmakers, 2014), indicates that 
screen. In line with the procedures of earlier studies 
(e.g., Van Dessel, Gawronski, Smith, & De Houwer, 
2017), a single trial consisted of a fixation cross 
presented for 500 ms, a blank screen for 500 ms, a 
prime for 200 ms, a blank screen for 50 ms, and the 
presentation of a target word. The inter-trial interval 
was set to vary randomly between 500 ms and 1500 
ms. Whenever an incorrect response was made or 
participants did not respond prior to the response 
deadline of 1500 ms, ‘Wrong’ was displayed in the 
center of the screen for 250 ms before the next trial. 
Participants were asked to respond as quickly as 
possible without making too many errors. With two 
types of primes and two types of targets, there were 
four prime-target combinations. Participants first 
completed eight practice trials, which were then 
followed by eighty critical test trials. The test trials 
were presented in a single block, with each of the four 
types of prime-target combinations presented twenty 
times in random order. 
Exploratory questions. Similar questions were 
provided as in Experiment 4.  
Results 
Data Preparation.  
Evaluative priming. Latencies from incorrect 
responses in the EPT (4.26% of the final sample) were 
eliminated and outlier latencies longer than 1000 ms 
and shorter than 300 ms (5.92% of the correct 
responses in the final sample) were removed. From the 
remaining trials we calculated two mean reaction 
times for each participant – one for congruent and one 
for incongruent trials (i.e., trials where the valence of 
the target stimulus during the priming task was the 
same/opposite to the assumed valence of the prime 
stimulus presented on screen [MORAG or STRUAN]). 
This comparison of mean reaction times on congruent 
versus incongruent trials represents the standard 
scoring and analytic procedure for Evaluative Priming 
tasks. 
Hypothesis Testing.  
Evaluative priming. Following our pre-
registered data collection and analysis plan, we 
analyzed the data after collecting 300 participants, but 
no conclusions could be made in favor of either the 
null of alternative hypotheses, BF10 = 1.42, μ = 4.21 
ms, 95% CI [0.95, 7.49], δ = 0.14, 95% CI [0.03, 0.26]. 
Adding 100 additional participants did not change 
this, BF10 = 0.76, μ = 3.39 ms, 95% CI [0.51, 6.29], δ 
= 0.11, 95% CI [0.02, 0.21]. When sample size was 
increased to 500 moderate evidence in favor of the 
the strength of evidence for one hypothesis compared to its 
competing hypothesis is regarded as noteworthy if BFs are 
above 3 or below 0.33. We therefore adopted these cutoff 
criteria. Notably, changing criterion for H0 (< 0.16 or < 0.33) 




alternative hypothesis was observed, BF10 = 3.11, μ = 
3.88 ms, 95% CI [1.28, 6.58], δ = 0.13, 95% CI [0.04, 
0.22]. For the sake of reader familiarity we also ran a 
(non-preregistered) frequentist between subjects 
Welch’s t-test that also suggested evidence in favor of 
the expected differences between congruent and 
incongruent trials, t(492) = 2.89, p = .004, d = 0.05, 
95% CI = [0.02, -0.08]. Participants’ therefore 
demonstrated an Evaluative Priming effect in the 
expected direction.  
Self-reported ratings. Whereas the sequential 
testing was used to determine sample size on the basis 
of the Evaluative Priming data only, data from the 
self-reported ratings and behavioral intentions were 
analyzed for the sample size only, as in our previous 
studies. Self-report ratings differed depending on the 
valence of the valenced word that shared a size with a 
neutral nonword, t(479.98) = 12.72, p < .001, d = 1.15, 
95% CI = [0.96, 1.35], BF10 > 106. When Morag was 
presented in the same size as positive words, and 
Struan was presented in the same size as negative 
words, participants preferred Morag over Struan (M = 
2.17, SD = 4.35). When the color contingencies were 
reversed, participants preferred Struan over Morag (M 
= -2.66, SD = 4.02). 
Behavioral intentions. Intentions towards the 
two nonwords differed between the two shared 
features conditions, in a manner that was congruent 
with prior training. Specifically, the odds that a 
participant would choose the nonword that shared a 
feature with a positive word (over the one that shared 
a feature with a negative word) were OR = 4.33, 95% 
CI = [2.77, 6.78], p < .0001. 
Discussion 
Once again self-reported and automatic 
evaluations as well as behavioral intentions emerged 
when stimuli shared a feature with one another. We 
not only replicated our finding that size can function 
as a shared feature but also generalized them from one 
indirect procedure (IAT) to another (EPT). Notably, 
the evaluative priming effect was small, and smaller 
than the effect obtained on the self-reported ratings, 
or on the other indirect procedure (IAT) that we used 
in our earlier studies. That said, our findings with the 
EP task were in line with what we observed with the 
IAT, self-reports, and behavioral intentions. This 
suggests that our findings are not specific to one 
indirect procedure, and thus strengthens the 
conclusion that the implementation of shared features 
can lead to changes in automatic evaluations. 
Experiment 8 
In the introduction we argued that many 
phenomena in psychological science may represent 
instances of the shared features principle. Yet so far 
we have almost exclusively relied on artificial stimuli 
(nonwords) to demonstrate the principle itself. 
Although these stimuli bear similarity to certain real-
world items (e.g., the names of novel brands or social 
groups) a more socially relevant demonstration seems 
warranted in order to support the larger claim being 
made here. With this in mind we created an entirely 
new task that used a more socially relevant set of 
stimuli (male faces) and yet another feature (common 
location). This task was designed to function as an 
experimental analogue of a classic social psychological 
manipulation: the minimal groups paradigm. This 
paradigm has often been used to study intergroup 
processes and set the stage for two highly influential 
theories in social psychology: Social Identity Theory 
(Tajfel, Turner, Austin, & Worchel, 1979) and Self 
Categorization Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, 
& Wetherell, 1987). 
The minimal groups paradigm involves a 
situation where participants are assigned to different 
groups. This assignment is typically arbitrary (i.e., 
based on some trivial criteria such as a coin toss or a 
shared preference for certain paintings), novel (not 
based on any pre-existing criteria), anonymous 
(participants lack awareness of who is assigned to their 
group and never interact with them), and as such, 
intergroup evaluations or resource allocation serves no 
direct utilitarian self-interest. Despite this participants 
still demonstrate a relative preference for the group to 
which they have been assigned: they often allocate 
resources in ways that favor their own group, view 
other group members favorably, and as being more 
similar to them than outgroup members (for a recent 
review see Otten, 2016).   
From a shared features perspective, certain 
minimal groups effects emerge when individuals are 
arbitrarily assigned to the same group based on some 
shared feature (e.g., similar clothing item or preference 
for certain paintings), and as a result, people then 
assume that those same individuals share other 
features as well (e.g., valence or personality traits). 
Drawing on this idea we created a task in which 
individuals did not share a feature with other 
individuals but rather with valenced events. 
Specifically, prior to the acquisition phase, 
participants were informed that the computer would 
pull images and words from two bags. Participants 
then saw a single stimulus onscreen (either an 
unknown male face or a positive or negatively valenced 
word) along with information highlighting from which 
bag that stimulus was pulled (e.g., “pulled from Bag 
1”). Across trials they could learn that one neutral face 
(Target 1) was pulled from the same bag as positive 
words whereas a second face (Target 2) was pulled 
from the same bag as negative words. If the shared 




(neutral face) and source (valenced image) share one 
feature (common bag location) may lead participants 
to infer that they also share other features (valence).  
It is worth noting that the acquisition phase was 
constructed so that stimuli appeared one at a time in 
random order. As such there was no spatio-temporal 
co-occurrence of the valenced words and neutral faces. 
Moreover, the task ensured that any contiguity 
between stimuli favored a neutral face being related to 
positive and negative words in equal measure. Thus it 
is unlikely that changes in liking would be driven by 
the spatio-temporal paring of stimuli (i.e., they do not 
represent instances of EC). Nevertheless, we decided 
to add a second condition in order to demonstrate that 
it was the shared feature and not mere spatio-temporal 
contiguity that moderated evaluations. Participants in 
this condition encountered a similar acquisition phase 
as outlined above but with one notable exception: 
information about which stimulus was pulled from 
which bag was never presented. An absence of 
evaluative responding in this condition would suggest 
that evaluations in the other condition are dependent 
on shared features.  
Finally, even stronger support for our argument 
would emerge if people were to demonstrate 
evaluations even when they were told that the words 
and faces were being pulled from the two bags at 
random. This would imply that there was no logical 
connection between those stimuli and that there is no 
such thing as a good or bad bag. We therefore included 
a third condition which was similar to the first 
condition with one exception: prior to and during the 
acquisition phase participants were informed that bag 
assignment was random and that there was no such 
thing as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ bag. If effects were to emerge 
here then it would suggest that shared features can 
guide evaluations even when people are told that those 
features are irrelevant and should be disregard.6 
 
 
                                                             
6 Most work has focused on a particular type of minimal 
groups effect - namely – one in which an individual is 
randomly assigned to one group and not another group on the 
basis of a stimulus (coin toss), stimulus property (they are 
wearing a similar clothing item to other group members), or 
response (they say they like one painter over another). In 
most cases, the individual being assigned to the group is the 
participant, and the outcome of interest is how that individual 
responds to other individuals (inside or outside their own 
group). The procedure we adopted also involves an individual 
being randomly assigned to a group on the basis of a stimulus 
(random allocation by the computer). As a result of this 
assignment behavior changes. Yet there are notable 
differences between the task used here and that used 
elsewhere: (a) the individual is no longer the participant but 
an unknown individual, (b) the group contains valenced 
Method  
Participants and design. 245 participants (140 
female, Mage = 29.17, SD = 7.48) took part in the 
study via the Prolific Academic website. A single 
factor between-participants design with three levels 
(Minimal Groups: Related vs. Unrelated vs. Random) 
was used and the same method factors manipulated as 
in Experiments 1-7. Data-collection was terminated 
when 240 participants completed the experiment. 
Recruiting 204 participants provided sufficient power 
(> 0.90) to observe a medium effect (f = 0.25) at alpha 
= 0.05. We decided to collect additional participants 
in order ensure that the necessary sample size was still 
obtained following exclusions. 
Stimuli. Two unknown male images (labelled 
Chris and James) served as neutral stimuli while ten 
positive (fantastic, wonderful, honest, kind, brave, 
amazing, nice, pleasant, selfless, great), ten negative 
adjectives (horrible, nasty, violent, terrible, hated, 
disgusting, mean, unpleasant, stupid, bully) served as 
valenced stimuli. 
Procedure. The procedure was similar to 
Experiment 3 with several exceptions (see below).  
Acquisition phase. In all three conditions 
training consisted of three blocks of 12 trials (36 total) 
consisting of four different randomly presented trial-
types: those that displayed one face (Chris), the 
second face (James), a positive word, or a negative 
word by itself in the middle of the screen for 4000ms. 
The stimulus was then removed, followed by a 2000ms 
ITI. The three conditions then differed in the following 
ways. 
Shared feature (location) condition. Prior to the 
acquisition phase participants were told the following: 
“The computer will now pull a word or image from two 
bags: Bag 1 & Bag 2. We will tell you what word or 
image was pulled from Bag 1 or Bag 2. Please pay 
attention to the words and images pulled from each 
bag”. During each trial a label was presented above 
the stimulus indicating from which bag it was pulled 
stimuli rather than other people, and (c) the outcome is not 
intergroup bias but changes in person perception. One might 
question to what extent these effects are still minimal group 
effects. As far as we can see, there is no a priori reason why 
a minimal group effect has to involve a limited set of 
procedural parameters (e.g., participant as individual; group 
comprised of other people, focus on intergroup bias). Instead, 
when viewed through the lens of our shared features account, 
one sees that there may be many other minimal group effects 
that have not been studied and which could open up 
interesting new avenues for exploration (i.e., minimal group 
effects where the individual is not the participant, where the 
group members are not necessarily other individuals, and the 
outcome is not only intergroup bias). The task introduced 




(i.e., “Pulled from Bag 1”, “Pulled from Bag 2”, “Pulled 
from Bag 3”, “Pulled from Bag 4”, “Pulled from Bag 5”, 
“Pulled from Bag 6”). The label assignments were 
varied as a function of block number and stimulus 
identity, such that one neutral face (e.g., Chris) and 
positive words were assigned to Bag 1 in Block 1, Bag 
3 in Block 2, and Bag 5 in Block 3 whereas a second 
neutral face (e.g., James) and negative words were 
assigned to Bag 2 in Block 1, Bag 4 in Block 2, and 
Bag 6 in Block 3. Note: assignment of the two faces to 
the same bags as positive and negative words was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Random condition. In addition to the instructions 
provided in the shared feature condition, participants 
in the random condition were also told the following: 
“The contents of each bag were randomly created. 
Thus there is no such thing as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ bag, 
nor is there a connection between the words and 
images that are pulled from each bag.” Participants 
were required to complete a manipulation check to 
ensure that they fully understood and processed these 
instructions before proceeding to a similar acquisition 
phase as in the shared features condition. 
No contiguity condition. Prior to training 
participants were informed that the computer would 
display a word or image and that they should pay 
attention to these items. During the acquisition phase 
itself, no information about bag assignment was 
provided. Instead each stimulus was presented by itself 
in a non-contingent manner in exactly the same way 
as in the other conditions but without info about the 
bags.. 
Evaluative measures. Evaluative measures 
were similar to Experiments 1-6.  
Exploratory questions. As similar set of 
exploratory questions were used as in Experiment 7, 
with several changes. First, the source valence 
awareness question asked: “In the beginning of the 
experiment the computer pulled words and images 
from two different bags. Did the words that were pulled 
from the bags...?” response options (always have a 
positive meaning, always have a negative meaning, 
have different meanings (e.g., some positive, some 
negative), I don't remember). Second, the target 
source contingency awareness question asked: “Think 
back to the first part of the experiment. Chris/James 
and another word were pulled from the same bag. Was 
Chris/James pulled from the same bag as...”, response 
options (Positive words, Negative words, I don’t 
                                                             
7 We were somewhat surprised to find an evaluative effect 
favoring one of the male images over the other in the no-
contiguity condition given that neither image was paired with 
valenced items. We therefore carried out another study to 
replicate this condition with a different randomization method 
remember). The shared feature awareness question 
asked: “Think back to the first part of the experiment. 
In the first part of the experiment we told you that 
words and images were pulled from two bags. We 
pulled Chris and negative words from one bag and 
James and positive words from another bag. Did you 
notice that this was happening during the first part of 
the study?, whereas the influence awareness question 
stated: “Do you think that the fact that Chris and 
negative words were pulled from one bag (and that 
James and positive words were pulled from another 
bag) influenced how much you like or dislike Chris or 
James?”. 
Results 
Data Preparation. Twenty participants failed to 
provide complete data. A further three failed to meet 
the IAT criteria. This led to a final sample of 222 
participants. 
Hypothesis Testing.  
IAT. IAT scores differed as a function of Minimal 
Group condition, F(2, 219) = 28.26, p < .0001, ηp2 = 
.21. Planned pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni-
Holm corrections for multiple testing indicated no 
evidence that IAT scores were different between the 
shared features condition (M = 0.28, 95% CI [0.18; 
0.38]) and random conditions (M = 0.16, 95% CI [0.06, 
0.26], pairwise p = .10), but provided evidence that 
both the shared features and random conditions 
differed from the no-contiguity condition (M = -0.20, 
95% CI [-0.29; -0.12]; both pairwise ps < .0001).  
Self-reported ratings. Ratings also differed as 
a function of Minimal Group condition, F(2, 219) = 
26.70, p < .0001, ηp2 = .20. Planned pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni-Holm corrections for 
multiple testing indicated no evidence that ratings 
were different between the shared features condition 
(M = 2.61, 95% CI [1.72, 3.49]) and random condition 
(M = 2.10, 95% CI [1.21; 3.00], pairwise p = .39), but 
provided evidence that both the shared features and 
random conditions differed from the no-contiguity 
condition (M = -1.14, 95% CI [-1.78; -0.50]; both 
pairwise ps < .0001). 
Discussion 
We once again obtained shared feature effects 
when a new feature (common location), set of socially 
relevant stimuli (faces), and procedure were employed. 
Not only did shared features guide intentions, self-
reported and automatic evaluations, but seemed to do 
so even when people were told that they were 
irrelevant and should be disregard.7 
to determine if comparable evaluations once again emerged. 
Analyses revealed an evaluative effect on the IAT, t(88) = -
3.90, p = .0002, d = -0.41, and self-reported ratings, t(88) = 
-5.71, p < .0001, d = -0.61 favoring the same male image over 





In order to (a) better estimate the evidence for 
the magnitude of learning via shared features and (b) 
determine the likelihood of observing shared features 
effects under other experimental conditions (i.e., to 
provide information about the generality of the effect 
itself), we carried out meta-analyses of Experiments 1-
8. In the case of Experiment 8, we included both 
conditions that involved a shared feature that one 
could learn from (i.e., the standard condition and the 
instructed randomness condition). Total sample size 
drawn from for the meta analyses was therefore n = 
1525. Random effects meta-analysis models were fitted 
using the metafor R package (Viechtbauer, 2010) and 
the maximum likelihood estimator function. A 
separate meta-analysis was fitted for each outcome 
variable (IAT, self-report ratings, and behavioral 
intentions; note that not every experiment contained 
every measure). Our general strategy was to first fit a 
meta-analytic model and assess for heterogeneity. If 
heterogeneity was undesirably large then we tested for 
the presence of outlier experiments using metrics of 
both excessive influence on the meta analyzed effect 
size (ΔSDeffect size) and excessive influence on 
heterogeneity (Δτ2) via leave-one-out analyses. 
Studies were only labeled as outliers if results from 
these tests were consistent across all three outcome 
variables (i.e., IAT, self-reports, & behavioral 
intentions). Analyses indicated that Experiment 2 was 
an outlier on the basis of undue influence on both the 
meta-analyzed effect size and heterogeneity and across 
all three outcome variables (full results from each 
metric available at osf.io/pqm9v). This was also 
congruent with our previous observation that the 
different instructions employed in Experiment 2 may 
have undermined the effect. As such, it was excluded 
and a second meta-analytic model was refit in each 
case. The results of both models are reported below. 
Forest plots of the robustness tests can also be found 
in Figure 8. 
IAT 
Fitting a meta-analytic model to the IAT revealed 
a significant effect of medium size (Cohen, 1988): k = 
8, d = 0.75, 95% CI = [0.42, 1.07], 95% CR = [-0.14, 
1.63], p < .0001. However, results were found to 
contain a high degree of heterogeneity, Q (df = 7) = 
36.81, p < .001, τ2 = 0.18, I2 = 83.28%, H2 = 5.98. 
Following the exclusion of Experiment 2 as an outlier, 
the meta-analyzed effect size was still found to be 
significant and had moved from medium to large effect 
size, k = 7, d = 0.86, 95% CI = [0.67, 1.06], 95% CR 
= [0.47, 1.26], p < .0001, and heterogeneity was found 
                                                             
condition was likely driven by a relative pre-existing 
preference for one stimulus over another that is not a function 
to lower, Q(df = 6) = 11.24, p < .001, τ2 = 0.03, I2 = 
47.02%, H2 = 1.89. 
 
 
Figure 8. Forest plots for IAT (top), self-report (middle), and 
behavioral intentions (bottom). Note that Experiment 2 was 





Fitting a meta-analytic model to the self-report 
ratings revealed a significant effect of large size, k = 9, 
d = 0.99, 95% CI = [0.62, 1.37], 95% CR = [-0.14, 
2.12], p < .0001, but with a high degree of 
heterogeneity: Q(df = 8) = 68.4, p < .001, τ2 = 0.29, 
I2 = 90.65%, H2 = 10.70. After excluding Experiment 
2, the meta-analyzed effect size was still significant 
and of large size, k = 8, d = 1.16, 95% CI = [0.91, 
1.41], 95% CR = [0.52, 1.80], p < .0001. Heterogeneity 
was also found to be reduced, Q(df = 7) = 22.72, p < 
.001, τ2 = 0.09, I2 = 75.08%, H2 = 4.01. 
 
 
of stimulus contiguity or contingency (i.e., this effect is not 
an instance of EC; for more details see osf.io/pqm9v). 
RE Model (I2 = 47.0%, H2 = 1.9)

















Implicit Association Test Cohen's d [95% CI]
RE Model (I2 = 75.1%, H2 = 4.0)



















Self−reported evaluations Cohen's d [95% CI]
RE Model (I2 = 46.4%, H2 = 1.9)








 4.33 [2.77,  6.78]
14.85 [6.98, 31.63]
 5.00 [1.91, 13.06]
 7.63 [3.11, 18.76]
 6.94 [2.03, 23.77]
13.66 [3.56, 52.43]
 7.26 [4.49, 11.72]




Table 2. Moderation of shared feature effects as a function of source valence awareness, target-source contingency 
awareness, hypothesis awareness, reactance, and demand compliance. 
 
  
 Subset included  
in the robustness tests 
Subset excluded  
from the robustness tests 
Difference  
between subsets 
DV Moderator n Effect size n Effect size χ2 p 
IAT       
 Source valence awareness 484 d = 0.83 [0.54, 1.12] 149 d = 0.85 [0.15, 1.54] 0.01 .933 
 Target source contingency awareness 348 d = 1.11 [0.46, 1.77] 218 d = 0.33 [-1.54, 2.20] 1.59 .207 
 Demand compliance 854 d = 0.80 [0.46, 1.13] 75 d = 0.76 [-0.16, 1.69] 0.01 .913 
 Reactance 839 d = 0.85 [0.67, 1.04] 96 d = 0.83 [0.13, 1.52] 0.01 .911 
Self-reported evaluations       
 Source valence awareness 865 d = 1.19 [1.02, 1.37] 256 d = 1.29 [0.80, 1.77] 0.36 .546 
 Target source contingency awareness 625 d = 1.80 [1.21, 2.40] 429 d = 0.34 [-1.43, 2.11] 5.98 .014 
 Demand compliance 1211 d = 1.05 [0.79, 1.30] 212 d = 1.80 [1.18, 2.43] 16.34 < .001 
 Reactance 1222 d = 1.19 [0.94, 1.44] 201 d = 0.92 [0.33, 1.51] 2.44 .118 
Behavioural intentions       
 Source valence awareness 805 OR = 1.89 [1.47, 2.32] 249 OR = 0.96 [-0.25, 2.18] 5.29 .021 
 Target source contingency awareness 625 OR = 2.88 [1.95, 3.82] 429 OR = 0.03 [-2.64, 2.69] 10.47 .001 
Notes: Subset employed in the robustness tests = results calculated using the subset of participants that was included in the 
robustness tests (i.e., those who were source-valence aware, target-source contingency aware, demand non-compliant, and non-
reactant); Subset excluded from the robustness tests = results calculated using the subset of participants that was excluded for the 
robustness tests (i.e., those who were source-valence unaware, target-source contingency unaware, demand compliant, and reactant); 




Odds Ratios for behavioral intentions were 
converted to log-odds before being meta analyzed. 
Results were converted back to Odds Ratios for 
plotting and reporting. Results revealed a significant 
meta-analytic effect of medium size (Chen, Cohen, & 
Chen, 2010): k = 7, Odds Ratio = 4.71, 95% CI = 
[1.70, 13.20], 95% CR = [0.31, 72.97], p = .003, and 
with a high degree of heterogeneity: Q(df = 6) = 42.25, 
p = .003, τ2 = 1.67, I2 = 89.78%, H2 = 9.79. After 
excluding Experiment 2, the meta-analyzed effect size 
was significant and now of large size, k = 6, Odds 
Ratio = 7.24, 95% CI = [4.48, 11.70], 95% CR = [2.92, 
17.99], p < .0001, and heterogeneity was reduced, Q(df 
= 5) = 9.31, p < .001, τ2 = 0.16, I2 = 46.44%, H2 = 
1.87. 
Robustness Tests 
In our preregistered analytic plan we stated we 
would examine the robustness of the shared feature 
effect when only considering participants who were 
contingency aware. We also said we would examine if 
the effect was still present after people who were 
demand compliant or reactant were removed. These 
exclusions are common in the EC literature: 
contingency awareness is often a necessary condition 
to observe evaluative effects (thus it was required; 
Hofmann et al., 2010), whereas the other two 
exclusions ensure that our effects were not 
contaminated by undesirable sources. Given that each 
individual study lacked the power to address this 
question we opted for a meta-analytic approach 
instead. Each respective subset of participants was 
excluded and separate meta-analytic models were refit. 
As in the previous meta analyses, robustness tests 
excluded Experiment 2 as an outlier. Robustness of 
conclusions was defined as congruence in the 
acceptance/rejection of the null hypothesis between 
results obtained from the full sample and those 
obtained in a given subset. 
Results were found to be robust to only including 
participants who were (a) aware (i.e., source valence 
awareness [77.5% of participants] and target source 
contingency awareness [59.6%]), (b) not demand 
compliant (80.9%), and (c) not reactant (85.8% on 
IAT, 89.7% on self-reports). This was found across all 
three outcome measures (IAT, self-reported 
evaluations, and behavioral intentions; all sensitivity 
analysis effect size ps < .002). In short, the general 
trend of evidence suggested that learning via shared 
features is robust to three common exclusions 
employed in the literature: requiring participants to be 
(contingency) aware, not demand compliant, and not 
reactant.  
Moderation Analyses  
Based on feedback from a reviewer, we also 
considered whether the shared feature effect was not 
merely robust to the aforementioned common 
exclusion criteria (i.e., source valence awareness, 
target source contingency awareness, demand 
compliance, reactivity), but was moderated by them. 
These analyses were therefore exploratory and not 




subsets of participants when calculating effect sizes, 
these multilevel moderator meta-analysis models 
instead calculated an effect size for both subsets (i.e., 
those subsets that were previously excluded and those 
were not) and examined moderation by the effect by 
this exclusion variable. The non-independence 
between the subsets from each study was 
acknowledged via a random intercept for study and a 
random slope for subset. In the case of some 
experiments, there were inadequate sample size in one 
subset to calculate an effect size. In such cases, the 
study was not included in the moderator meta 
analyses (i.e., only experiments where a pairs of 
subsets existed were included). Effect sizes for both 
subsets in each study and moderation tests are 
included in Table 2. Given the relatively large number 
of parameters being estimated in each of these models 
(i.e., effect sizes for each subset, estimation of 
moderation, as well as random slopes and intercepts) 
combined with the low sample sizes in the subsets that 
were previously excluded for the robustness tests, 
these analyses likely demonstrated relatively low 
power to detect effects (see Table 2 for ns and 
confidence intervals). No consistent evidence was 
found across the outcome variables for any of the 
moderators.  
General Discussion 
In this paper we introduced the shared features 
principle which postulates that when two stimuli share 
one feature people assume that they share other 
features as well. Although this principle may underpin 
many different phenomena in psychological science we 
sought to illustrate its predictive value in the domain 
of attitudes, test its potential boundary conditions, 
and demonstrate that it holds across different physical 
and conceptual features, outcome measures, and 
training procedures. Across eight studies we exposed 
participants to an acquisition phase that typically 
contained three stimuli: a neutral target, a positive 
source, and a negative source. We then manipulated 
each trial so that a target would either share a 
common color (Experiments 1, 2, 3, 6), size 
(Experiments 4 and 7) or location (Experiment 8) with 
one of the source objects. To demonstrate that our 
account speaks to both physical and conceptual 
features, Experiment 5 created two conceptual color 
categories (Blue-Similar-Yellow, and Green-Similar-
Purple) and then, during the acquisition phase, 
presented a target and source stimulus in a different 
color from the same category (e.g., target in blue and 
source in yellow). In all experiments except 
Experiment 2, we observed that liking of the target 
object changed in the direction of the valence of the 
source object with which the target object shared a 
feature. The unexpected results of Experiment 2 were 
likely a consequence of instructions that directed 
attention away from shared features and towards 
changes in stimulus features (for more see below). 
Taken together, our results provide strong and 
repeated support for the shared features principle. 
Changes in liking were not driven by mere contiguity 
but instead by the features that targets and sources 
shared with one another. This was demonstrated most 
clearly in Experiment 8 where stimuli were never 
paired. These shared feature effects were evident from 
self-reported ratings, behavioral intentions, evaluative 
priming, and IAT effects which consistently favored 
one target over the other. They also emerged 
regardless of the type (color, size, location) and nature 
(physical or conceptual) of feature manipulated and 
acquisition procedure used. These conclusions were 
further reinforced by our meta-analysis, in which 
shared features were shown to produce large effect 
sizes across measures of automatic evaluation, self-
reported evaluation, and behavioral intentions. The 
relatively large degree of heterogeneity in the effect 
sizes between studies reflects the differing instances 
and implementations of shared features that were 
implemented between studies. Indeed, the credibility 
intervals (i.e., 95% CR, which reflect the likely range 
of effect sizes to be observed given both the estimated 
true effect size and the observed heterogeneity 
between studies) excluded zero by a large margin for 
all outcome variables (IAT, self-reports, and 
behavioral intentions), suggesting that learning via 
shared features is also highly likely to be observed in 
future studies under other as-yet unobserved 
implementations of the concept. We can therefore say 
that the shared features effect appears to be replicable, 
robust across a range of outcome measures and 
common exclusion criteria, and general across multiple 
instances and implementations.  
Theoretical Implications 
Until now we focused on the shared features 
principle itself and said little about why it actually 
emerges. There are two different levels at which to 
explain shared features effects (De Houwer, 2011; 
Hughes, De Houwer, & Perugini, 2016): (1) a mental 
level that aims to uncover the mental mechanisms that 
mediate the impact of the environment on behavior 
and (2) a functional level that aims to describe those 
elements of the environment that moderate behavior. 
We consider both in turn but will only briefly discuss 
one possible theoretical approach within each level. 
Undoubtedly, there are many other theoretical 
approaches that could be related to shared features 
effects. Although we look forward to the theoretical 
debates that our findings will spark, within the context 
of the present paper with its focus on establishing the 




level and highlight only two approaches that appear 
particularly interesting to us.  
The functional level of explanation: The sharing 
of features as a contextual relational cue. Without 
going into too much detail, functional explanations are 
not concerned with identifying mental representations 
and processes. Instead they seek to relate specific 
effects to more general behavioral principles using 
terms that refer to the function of events (for a 
detailed treatment see De Houwer & Hughes, 2020; 
Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016). At this level shared 
features effects could be conceptualized as an instance 
of relational responding (i.e., a type of behavior that 
involves ‘responding to the relationship between 
stimuli’). Relational responses are typically emitted in 
the presence of a stimulus called a relational contextual 
cue. This stimulus is a contextual cue in the sense that 
it signals (cues) how one should respond, and it is 
relational because it signals that a relational response 
should be emitted in that context. Take, for instance, 
a non-relational contextual cue such as a red traffic 
light at a busy intersection. This light signals how one 
should respond in that context (i.e., that walking 
across the street when the light is red will be 
dangerous for that person). Relational contextual cues 
require us to take this idea one step further. They also 
signal how one should respond. But instead of 
responding to just one stimulus they indicate that we 
should respond based to how stimuli are related to one 
another in that context.  
To illustrate, imagine that you are presented with 
a positive word along with an unknown word. If this 
pair of stimuli is accompanied by the word ‘SAME’ 
this may signal to you that the unknown word has the 
same (evaluative) meaning as the positive word. As a 
result you will subsequently like the unknown word 
more than before. In this example the word SAME 
functions as a relational contextual cue: it signals that 
a relation of similarity exists between the unknown 
and positive word. One could conceptualize shared 
physical features such as color (Experiments 1,2,3,6), 
size (Experiments 4, 7) and location (Experiment 8) in 
much the same way: as a relational contextual cue 
which signaled a relation of similarity between two of 
the three stimuli presented in an acquisition trial (a 
neutral target and either a positive or negative 
source). Once such a relationship was formed other 
source features were transferred to the target 
(valence), thus leading to a change in evaluative 
responding. The fact that conceptual features also 
moderated evaluations and intentions (Experiment 5) 
                                                             
8 In this way the term ‘inference’ describes the outcome of the 
computation process rather than the computation process 
itself. The computational process of inferential reasoning can 
occur on the basis of many different inference rules (e.g., rules 
is consistent with past work on the effects of relational 
contextual cues (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016). 
Thus, our shared feature effects are in line with 
modern (functional) conceptualizations of learning and 
behavior (e.g., Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), 
and particularly with the idea of relational contextual 
cues. 
The mental level of explanation: Inferential 
reasoning. At the mental level the goal is to identify 
the mental representations and processes that mediate 
between environment and behavior. We believe that 
shared feature effects fit well with an inferential 
perspective on human learning and attitudes (e.g., De 
Houwer, 2018; Van Dessel, Hughes, & De Houwer, 
2019). The core conceptual unit of this perspective is 
a proposition, that is, an informational unit “that 
contains information about the nature of the relation 
between stimuli (e.g., A predicts B, A causes B, A co-
occurs with B, …)” (De Houwer, 2018, p.3). Inferences 
represent a sub-type of such propositions – namely – 
those generated from other momentarily available 
propositions. “The construction process that leads to 
the inference can be seen as an information generation 
procedure that involves the application of information 
generation (i.e., inference) rules to information that is 
currently entertained” (Van Dessel et al., 2019, p.4).8  
In our studies the fact that the source and target 
object shared a feature may have caused participants 
to form a series of inferences about (a) how those 
stimuli were related and (b) the properties of the 
target object. It might have been these inferences 
which mediated subsequent evaluations and 
intentions. For instance, during the acquisition phase 
in Experiments 1-5, participants may have formed a 
number of simple propositions concerning the source 
and target objects (e.g., ‘the target is presented in 
green’, ‘the positive source is presented green’, and 
‘the negative source is presented in purple’). They may 
have also generated a number of propositions about 
the source and target object features (e.g., ‘this word 
[target] is neutral’, ‘that word [source] is positive’ and 
‘that word [source] is negative’). These basic 
propositions may have served as the ‘raw ingredients’ 
for a relational inference (‘the target and source are 
similar in that they are both green’) which could have 
led to an inference about the target objects features 
(‘the source is good therefore the target is also good’). 
Note that these inferences were generated on the basis 
of both physical and conceptual features that objects 
shared. Thus, from an inferential perspective, the 
‘assumptions’ at the core of shared feature effects are 
that encode general statements about the world [if-then rules] 
or rules based on mere similarity [analogical mapping rules]; 




actually inferences that are constructed on the basis of 
past and present propositions about the source and 
target objects, their features, and how they are related. 
Also note that more research is needed to examine the 
exact nature of the inferences that people make, as 
well as the nature of the premises on which these 
inferences are based. Within the context of the present 
paper, we limit ourselves to highlighting inferential 
models as one possible theoretical approach that could 
help shed light on the mechanisms underlying shared 
feature effects. 
Open Questions, Broader Implications, and Future 
Directions 
In this paper we find that shared features can be 
used to establish self-reported and automatic 
evaluations of novel stimuli (Experiments 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7) and influence people’s first impressions of 
others (Experiment 8). Nevertheless, we recognize that 
there is still a gap between the specific findings 
reported here and the broader framing we offered in 
the introduction. In order to close this gap research 
will be needed showing that the shared features 
principle underpins both old and new phenomena in 
the field. Such work will need to show that the 
principle is responsible for changes in both evaluative 
and non-evaluative stimulus properties, and in ways 
that are relevant to clinical (e.g., fear, anxiety, 
disgust), social (e.g., accessibility), consumer (e.g., 
brand quality, brand identification), and cognitive 
psychology (e.g., attention). Researchers will also need 
to show that shared features effects not only drive 
evaluations but judgements, decisions, and behavior 
outside of the laboratory as well. Take, for instance, 
the brand mimicry effect studied in business and 
marketing: does the fact that a newly introduced 
brand product (e.g., a so called ‘meatless’ meat 
burger) shares a feature (shape, consistency, texture) 
with a known product (e.g., beef burger) lead people 
to assume that those products share other features 
(e.g., taste) and does this influence their decisions to 
purchase and consume the former more than the 
latter? Is the same true for other products – both legal 
(e.g., generic medications that share features with 
copyrighted mediations) and illegal (e.g., counterfeit 
luxury items that shared features with their authentic 
counterparts). In other words, does the fact that the 
target product shares one feature with a source 
product lead people to assume that both products 
share other features? If such findings were to emerge 
it would further support the idea that many known 
and to-be-discovered phenomena in psychological 
science represent instances of the same basic (shared 
features) principle. 
We also limited our initial efforts to the formation 
of attitudes. Future work could investigate whether 
shared features can also be used to strengthen or revise 
existing evaluations as well. For instance, researchers 
could first establish a novel evaluation towards an 
unknown object, or take a pre-existing evaluations 
towards a known object (e.g., towards a celebrity, 
brand product, phobic, or clinically relevant stimulus 
such as spiders or alcohol). Those evaluations could 
then be modified using a similar task as used in 
Experiments 1-5. For instance, imagine that 
participants first complete the same acquisition phase 
as we used here to generate an evaluation and were 
then exposed to similar phase designed to reverse those 
initial evaluations. Researchers could vary this second 
task so that the target no longer shares a color with 
either type of source (similar to extinction in EC 
research; e.g., Gawronski, Gast, & De Houwer, 2015), 
swap the shared feature contingencies so that the 
target now shares a feature with the opposite source 
used in the first phase (similar to counter conditioning 
in EC research; Kerkhof, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & 
Hermans, 2011) or is exposed to the exact same 
contingencies as before, but between the formation 
and change phases, the source the target share a 
feature with is subjected to a revaluation procedure 
that changes its valence. In each case, they could 
examine if evaluations of the target change as a result 
of such manipulations.  
When carrying out this work, researchers can also 
investigate the factors that moderate shared feature 
effects. For instance, such work could examine if the 
type and nature of the shared features, or the 
properties of the source and target objects, or the 
types of features being transformed from one object to 
another matters across different domains. 
How shared features are established and changed 
may also matter: it may be easier to form and modify 
these effects via experience relative to observation or 
instruction. It might also be that these effects are 
subject to certain boundary conditions. For instance, 
in Experiments 2-3, directing attention towards the 
shared feature led to automatic and self-reported 
evaluations whereas directing attention away from 
that feature failed to produce such effects. One 
possibility is that people treat shared features as a cue 
that is ‘diagnostic’ for how they should respond to the 
target object (i.e., how they should evaluate the 
target). It may be that the impact of shared features 
on behavior is moderated by other cues in the 
environment which signal to what extent the shared 
feature is diagnostic or not when making a judgement. 
There may be still other conditions necessary for these 
effects to emerge and change that should also be 
examined. The current studies utilized only two types 
of procedure to document these effects and readers 




latter. Many other procedures could be devised to 
study this class of effects.  
We previously argued that shared features could 
be conceptualized as relational contextual cues. If so, 
then it should be possible to change the relational 
meaning of the fact that objects share features, and 
thus the assumptions people make about target object 
features on the basis of those shared features. 
Although a shared feature will typically signal that the 
source and target objects are similar to one another 
(and thus give rise to feature transfer) there is no 
reason why a shared feature cannot instead signal that 
the source and target are related in other ways (and 
thus give rise to feature transformation). For instance, 
it may be that the feature shared by a source and 
target object signals that those objects are opposite, 
hierarchical, different, or related in any number of 
other ways. This also seems like a promising research 
direction for future research. 
Another interesting possibility is that opposite 
features may influence behavior as well. In a recent set 
of unpublished studies that were conducted in our lab 
participants were exposed to a simple learning task 
where participants had to assign valenced words to the 
left-side of the screen and unknown nonwords to the 
right-side of the screen. Following training the 
nonwords acquired an opposite valence to the valence 
items themselves. In this case, a source (valenced) and 
target (nonword) object did not share a feature with 
one another but possessed an opposite feature (i.e., one 
was linked to a left response and the other to a right 
response). The fact that they possessed opposite 
features (i.e., that they were assigned to opposite 
responses) may have led people to make certain 
assumptions about the target object based on the 
source object features (i.e., that the nonwords had an 
opposite valence to the source). If so then there may 
be an ‘opposite features effect’ waiting to be 
systematically explored. 
Our findings also lead to new perspectives on 
human learning. In this area researchers have long 
made a distinction between acquisition (the emergence 
of a novel response in the presence of a stimulus) and 
generalization (the transfer of response-eliciting 
properties from one stimulus to another). In evaluative 
conditioning, for instance, researchers initially utilize 
an acquisition phase with contiguously presented 
stimuli to generate an evaluative response to a 
conditioned stimulus, and then use a generalization 
phase to test if this evaluative response transfers from 
one conditioned stimulus to another (e.g., Till & 
Priluck, 2000). Yet our work suggests that spatio-
temporal contiguity might just be one way to induce 
a shared feature that provides the basis for feature 
transformation. We also argue that the shared features 
principle is itself rooted in the phenomenon of 
generalization. If we combine these two ideas we arrive 
at an interesting new possibility: acquisition and 
generalization may be more similar to one another 
than previously thought. For instance, in evaluative 
conditioning, EC effects can be conceived of as a 
transfer of evaluative properties based on the fact that 
stimuli share some other property with one another 
(common location in space and time). Evaluative 
generalization effects can also be conceived of as a 
transfer of evaluative properties based on the fact that 
stimuli share some other property with one another 
(common physical or conceptual property). In other 
words, acquisition and generalization can both be seen 
as feature transformation effects that occur when 
objects share features. When viewed in this way we 
see that acquisition research has often tended to focus 
on one shared feature (spatio-temporal properties) 
whereas generalization research has focused on others 
(perceptual or conceptual features). Yet from a shared 
features principle perspective, acquisition and 
generalization may both be instances of feature 
transformation. 
Potential Limitations  
One could ask if demand plays a role in our 
findings given that the experimental manipulations 
were relatively simple and salient (i.e., the color, size, 
or common location of a neutral and valenced stimulus 
varied in systematic ways). It may be that participants 
identified the manipulation and reported what they 
thought the researcher wanted to hear. While a 
reasonable suggestion, we see several reasons for why 
our effects are not driven by demand. First, we 
indexed our evaluative effects using multiple indirect 
tasks (IAT and evaluative priming) which are 
typically less sensitive to demand effects than direct 
measures such as self-report ratings. Second, we 
obtained similar effects across studies even after 
demand compliant participants had been removed 
from analyses (see the section on Robustness tests). 
Third, in Experiment 8, we still obtained evaluative 
effects even when we told people that the shared 
feature was irrelevant and invalid information for 
forming evaluations. In other words, even when people 
were told to disregard the key experimental factor (bag 
location) and reported that they knew this factor was 
irrelevant, they still showed an effect. This seems like 
a particularly strong test of the impact of shared 
features on evaluation. When taken together these 
three strands of evidence would argue against a simple 
demand or communication effect interpretation of our 
findings. Nevertheless, future work could seek to 
further control for this possibility (e.g., by using still 
other indirect measures, a better cover story, 




shared feature, or by adding a training phase that 
obscures the shared feature more extensively). That 
work could also examine why the effects were 
relatively large on one indirect procedure (IAT) and 
small on another (evaluative priming). It may be that 
additional training is needed, movement away from 
repetition of just two prime words, or other procedural 
parameters will increase the size of the effect on the 
latter procedure.9 
Context of the Research 
The co-authors on this paper share several 
features. Perhaps the most important is an interest in 
developing useful ways of speaking (definitions, terms, 
and concepts) and thinking (nomothetic systems) that 
can help stimulate better communication and 
interaction between researchers, both inside and 
outside of psychological science. Such an approach 
should be relatively broad in its scope, not limited to 
any one theory or content domain, and provide a 
common language that would facilitate dialogue 
between those that typically do not. This has recently 
given rise to a new conceptual tool-box (the Feature 
Transformation framework) that we hope will foster 
progress on at least some of these objectives. If nothing 
else, this new framework (and the ways of speaking 
and thinking it occasions) guided much of the current 
work, has started to shift how we view many other 
phenomena in psychology, and has unlocked exciting 
new research directions (e.g., on related and non-
related feature effects). Building on these initial 
laboratory demonstrations of the basic principle, our 
next step is to showcase how previously identified 
phenomena (e.g., stigmatization, stereotyping, 
persuasion, moral, and certain marketing effects) are 
– fully or in part – driven by this principle, better 
explore its moderators and potential boundary 
conditions, and identify new instances of the shared 
feature effect.  
Conclusion 
In this paper we introduce the shared features 
principle and provide an initial test of its heuristic and 
predictive value. We found that when a valenced 
source and neutral target object shared one feature 
with one another (color or size), this was enough to 
influence assumptions about other features of the 
target (valence). This was true for both automatic and 
                                                             
9 In Experiment 8 participants were informed that the 
contents of each bag were randomly created. Thus there is no 
such thing as a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ bag, nor was there a 
connection between the words and images that were pulled 
from each bag. Although we obtained an impact of these 
instructions, it is not entirely clear if participants (a) viewed 
contingencies between the source and target objects emerging 
from each bag as random (when in fact they were not), or if 
they (b) viewed the targets as having been randomly assigned 
self-reported evaluations and when the type and 
nature of the shared feature was varied. Across 
experiments and in meta analyses, the principle was 
found to produce effects that were replicable, robust, 
and general. Although this paper focused on just one 
domain (attitudes) our conceptual account applies to 
many more, and offers a unified way to describe and 
analyze shared feature effects throughout 
psychological science. In all likelihood, there are many 
other domains and phenomena that could be 
conceptualized as instances of shared feature effects 
than covered here. We hope that our account will 
stimulate a new wave of research on this topic and 
contribute to a broader and deeper understanding of 
the way in which people arrive at assumptions about 
the features of objects in their environment. 
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